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Employment security is a fundamental right that stems from the prohibition of unfair dismissals 
in the Labour Relations Act.
1
 Section 197 bridges the gap between business transfers and unfair 
dismissals by creating an automatic transfer of employment contracts of any employees affected 
by the transfer of a business by an old employer to a new employer as a going concern. The 
wording of the section is however, problematic. From the time that it was promulgated, the true 
meaning of section 197 has been heavily debated. The Legislature’s intention to protect 
employment security and facilitate the efficient transfer of businesses has been identified by 
courts. However, the difficulty faced in interpreting this provision raises the question of whether 
the purpose of the section is being subverted by judicial interpretation.  
1. Introduction 
The transfer of a business as a going concern by one employer to another is a transaction that has 
significant effects on a wide range of people. These effects permeate into the commercial, legal, 
and socio-economic aspects of the affected individuals’ lives. The affected individuals range 
from employers, stakeholders and employees of the business, to the individuals in the general 
public who have interests within a particular business. The legal transfer of a business to a new 
employer shifts a collection of rights and obligations concerning the affected employees to the 
aforementioned employer, who essentially steps into the shoes of the old employer in this 
respect.
2
 Thus to the extent that the LRA seeks to advance economic development, social justice, 
labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace,
3
 the role played by section 197 in 
regulating business transfers is of great importance in the labour relations sector. 
                                                        
1
 Act 66 of 1995. Hereafter referred to as the LRA. 
2
 C Todd et al, ‘Business Transfers and Employment Rights in South Africa’, LexisNexis Butterworths 2004, at 8. 
3
 Section 1 of the LRA 
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The purpose of section 197 is analysed, with specific reference to the legal lacuna that the 
Legislature had to fill due to the inadequacy of the common law in regulating business transfers.
4
 
This paper analyses the manner and degree of efficacy in which section 197 regulates business 
transfers, particularly in light of the role that the provision plays in balancing the apparently 
conflicting rights of employers and employees. As set out by the Constitutional Court in 
NEHAWU v University of Cape Town,
5
 the inherent clash of interests that characterises labour 
relations in South Africa reaches its peak when the transfer of a business to a new employer is 
contemplated.
6
 Thus, the interests of both employers and employees in the context of a business 
transfer are analysed in this paper. It is submitted that despite the fact that section 197 balances 
the interests of both employers and employees, this paper seeks to analyse whether courts are 
giving effect to their constitutional mandate to protect employees,
7
 who are still a vulnerable 
group in South Africa. Thus the manner that section 197 is interpreted and applied by judges will 
be scrutinised, especially in light of the purpose that section 197 plays in ensuring that 
employees faced with a change in employer have the right to employment security. The courts’ 
interpretation of section 197 will also be measured against the approach adopted in foreign 
jurisdictions when attempting to interpret and give effect to business transfer legislation.
8
  
This paper focuses on the application of section 197 to cases where a part of a business is 
outsourced to another business. Outsourcing ventures and businesses are a rapidly growing 
market in South Africa. Ranging from governmental bodies, parastatals, universities to private 
businesses,
9
 employers are increasingly opting to contract with an outside party to provide for 
certain services within the business, or the performance of specific work. Outsourcing was 
initially used to describe a decision by a business to obtain services from an outside party, that it 
                                                        
4
 See Chapter Two. 
5
 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC). 
6
 Ibid  para 31. 
7
 Section 23 of the Constitution guarantees employees the right to fair labour practices. 
8
 See page 27, Section 4.3. 
9
For example, the latest ‘Non-financial census of municipalities’ for the year ended 30 June 2012  by Statistics 
South Africa indicated that the total number of municipalities that outsourced electricity services to private 
companies rose from 20 in 2009, to 166 in June 2012. This has permeated into the private commercial sector, 
although it is difficult to acquire reliable statistical data on this. 
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had hitherto carried out internally or obtained by employing its own staff.
10
 There are a wide 
variety of services that can be carried out in outsourcing businesses. The services could be 
relatively menial, 
11
 or require technical skills.
12
 Even highly skilled or professional activities 
may be the subject of outsourcing.
13
 However, the analysis of outsourcing is particularly 
important in services that involve routine manual labour, given that predominantly unskilled 
labourers perform these tasks. These are oftentimes vulnerable members of society, and need 
protection against unfair labour practices and unfair dismissals.
14
  Thus, coupled with the ever-
growing popularity of these commercial structures, the influx of outsourcing cases in South 
African is unsurprising. This is therefore a relevant are of law that is in great need of 
clarification. 
This paper highlights the difficulties in interpreting section 197; a section which has 
unfortunately been surrounded with confusion and debate since it was enacted in the 1995 
LRA.
15
 The major source of controversy is the threshold clause in section 197(1), which 
determines the applicability of the section to a given set of facts. It is necessary to state at the 
outset that three important factors have been identified as the trigger mechanisms for the 
application of section 197.
16
 Firstly, there must be an entity that is the whole or part of a 
business. Secondly, the transfer must be carried out by one employer to another. Thirdly, the 
transfer must be carried out as a going concern.
17
Thus the paper attempts to examine how the 
courts have construed the contentious clauses, with particular reference to outsourcing 
contracts.
18
 It is anticipated that the primary issues that arise when interpreting the section in 
outsourcing cases are whether a service can amount to a business under section 197(1)(a), and 
                                                        
10
 M Wallis, ‘It's Not Bye- to 'By': Some Reflections on Section 197 of the LRA’ (2013) 34 ILJ 779, at 794. 
11
 Such as cleaning of offices and other business premises, garden maintenance, waste management, security guards, 
laundry services, a call centre, or the operation of catering services or a canteen. 
12
 Such as fleet maintenance, logistical support, or the provision of transport services.  
13
 For example, the provision of legal or accounting services, computer services, public relations or airport 
management services. 
14
 See note 31. 
15
 C Todd et al, op cit note 2 at 21. 
16
 Schatz v Elliott International (Pty) Ltd & Another (2008) 29 ILJ 2286 (LC). 
17
 Ibid para 36. 
18
 See Chapter Five. 
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the meaning of the requirement that a transfer to be carried out ‘by’ an old employer to a new 
employer.
19
 The adequacy of section 197 in protecting the right to employment security will thus 
be scrutinised. It is anticipated that the lack of consensus in South African courts on how to 
interpret section 197(1) is the main contributing factor to the difficulties surrounding section 197, 
which raises the question of whether the courts are giving effect to the purpose of the section.  
2. Chapter One- The common law position and legislative 
developments 
In order to sufficiently grasp the purpose of section 197, it is necessary to analyse how the 
common law regulated the transfer of a business as a going concern. This chapter analyses the 
state of business transfer law before section 197 was enacted in the 1995 LRA.  The discussion 
below thus analyses how the common law position failed to give effect to both the employee and 
employer’s rights and interests.  
2.1. Business transfers under the common law 
Prior to the 1995 LRA, there was no general statutory protection of employees upon the transfer 
of a business.
20
 With almost no mention of the legal consequence of business transfers in the 
legislative framework,
21
 the common law regulated this matter. Under this system, the default 
position was the termination of employment contracts upon the transfer of a business. The only 
possible alternative to termination was the novation of the employment contract by way of 
agreement between the employee and the new employer. If novation was agreed on, the old 
                                                        
19
 In terms of section 197(1)(b). 
20
 W Blackie et al, ‘Transfer of Contracts of Employment as a Result of Mergers and Acquisitions: A Study of 
Section 197 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995’ (1999) 20 ILJ 1387 at 1387. 
21
 However, section 22(5)(a) of the Manpower Training Act 56 of 1981 provided for automatic transfers of 
apprenticeship contracts upon the dissolution and subsequent revival of a partnership by new partners. Section 12 of 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1983 also allowed for the transfer of an employee’s accrued leave 
benefits upon transfer of a business; but only if the new employer chose to retain the employee. 
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contract would be replaced with a new one- with the terms and conditions thereof completely at 
the new employer’s discretion.
22
  
The main policy reason behind the common law position, as set out in Nokes v Doncaster 
Amalgamated Collieries Ltd,
23
 was the characterisation of employment contracts as personal 
contracts existing between an employer and employee. The identity of an employer was by 
principle, regarded as fundamental to the employment contract in English law.
24
 As a result, the 
law was structured to protect the privity of contract between the two original parties to an 
employment contract. In Nokes, Lord Atkin expressed that the personal relationship between an 
employer and his employee could not be unilaterally altered by the former.
25
 Consequently, the 
employee’s consent was required before his employment contract could be transferred to the new 
business owner.  
The Industrial Court analysed the common law rules in Kebeni & others v Cementile Products 
(Ciskei) (Pty) Ltd & another,
26
 where the respondent company took ownership of another 
company, purely to carry out (otherwise unlawful) selective re-employment of employees. The 
Industrial Court, per Bulbulia M gave a progressive judgment and went beyond a rigid 
application of the common law, in order to protect the unfairly dismissed employees. Looking at 
the facts of the case, the employees were merely pawns ‘in a ruse to enable the (employer) to 
carry out an exercise in selective re-employment.’
27
 Under the common law, the termination of 
employment contracts for transfer purposes fell outside the scope of the unfair or automatically 
unfair dismissal inquiries.
28
 Furthermore, any possibility of re-employment was completely at 
the discretion of the respondent, which used subjective and commercially-motivated selection 
criteria.
29
Thus the case illustrated the vulnerability of employees under the common law system, 
                                                        
22
 W Blackie et al op cit note 20. 
23
 (1940) AC 1014 (HL). 
24
Op cit Todd et al note 2 at 7. 
25
 In this regard, Lord Atkin held that an employee’s right of choice ‘constituted the main difference between a 
servant and a serf’, at 1026. 
26
 (1987) 8 ILJ 442 (IC). 
27
 Ibid, at 446. 
28









In this regard, Bulbulia M held that, ‘unilateral conduct is not always fair simply because it has a 
commercial rationale to it.’
31
 In addition, there must be legitimacy present when drastic actions 
such as business transfers are decided on. Bulbulia relied on the principle of fairness to develop 
the common law to the extent that substantive and procedural fairness have to be considered, 
especially in the process of retrenching for transfer purposes.
32
 Furthermore, he formulated a 
procedural guideline to ensure that employees receive fair treatment in any circumstances 
contemplating a change in employer.
33
  
Most importantly, the Court suggested that parties to a business transfer should contractually 
bind themselves to what amounts to an automatic transfer of employee contracts from the old 
employer to the new employer, once the business has been transferred.
34
 Bulbulia M raised the 
suggestion of automatic transfer of employee contracts in terms of ‘safeguard clauses’, which 
would essentially protect workforce security in business transfers. These clauses would render all 
employment contracts transferred to the new employer, who would then be obliged to retain all 
existing employees without discrimination, unless an individual employee chooses not to 
continue his employment.
35
 This dictum was directly influenced by English law, which regulated 
employee protection in business transfers at the time.
36
 
                                                        
30
 The transfer in casu occurred subsequent to ‘labour problems’ arising from disputes between a trade union and the 
employer This had become a common practice prior to the enactment of section 197. 
31




 The procedure should at least include adequate notice and consultation of the proposed take-over by the employer; 
sufficient prior notice of the take-over; an agreement between the transferor and transferee of the employees’ rights. 
34




 Bulbulia M compared the use of these safeguard clauses to of the Transfer of Undertakings: Protection of 
Employment Regulations of 1981 in the UK. Regulation 4(1) states that, ‘a relevant transfer shall not operate so as 
to terminate the contract of employment of any person employed by the transferor and assigned to the organised 
grouping of resources or employees that is subject to the relevant transfer.’  
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The judgment in Kebeni set in motion possible development of business transfer law. However, 
the progressive judgment did not actually develop the common law, as the employer was held 
liable in terms of ordinary unfair dismissal law. Furthermore, subsequent cases reverted to 
reliance on the common law. In Ntuli & others v Hazelmore Group, 
37
 the Industrial Court gave a 
disappointingly regressive judgment which gave effect to neither the principles formed in 
Kebeni, nor to foreign examples of transfer of undertakings law. Adopting a formalistic 
interpretation of the common law, the Court in Ntuli held that there was no foundation for the 
argument that there is continuous employment with a new employer subsequent to the transfer of 
a business.
38
 The Court interpreted continuous employment as a contractual right, borne out of 
agreement between the transferee and the employees. Therefore, the transfer of employment 
contracts to the new employer was not a right, but a state of affairs ‘conditional in law’.
39
 Thus 
the Court rejected the idea of automatic transfer of employment contracts as an appropriate 
solution.
40
 The examples set by international labour jurisprudence were also rejected, as the 
principles of equity did not require the Court to adopt the principles embodied in the European 
Economic Community Directive 77/187
41
 (which section 197 was drafted very similarly to).
42
  
The discussion above illustrates that despite the awareness by courts that the common law was 
inadequate in regulating business transfers, nothing was being done to change that. Courts were 
deferential to business owners, and based the obligation on employers to retain employees on 
principles of contract law. Not only did this prejudice the socio-economic interests of employees, 
but it also hampered the transfer process, to the detriment of the employers. For example, if a 
new employer wished to keep an entire workforce, lengthy negotiation periods would 
understandably ensue during the employment contract novation process. However, the principles 
established in Kebeni did not fall on deaf ears, as the LRA was eventually amended to include 
section 197, which came into effect in the 1995 LRA. 
                                                        
37
 (1988) 9 ILJ 709 (IC). 
38




 Ibid at 720. 
41
 The Acquired Rights Directive 77/187/EEC. 
42
 Supra note 37 at 719. 
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2.2. Section 197  
This section analyses the individual provisions of section 197. The discussion will be limited to 
the sections that are relevant to the scope of this paper. 
2.2.1. The threshold clause 
Subsection (1) is the central clause in the section, as it determines whether or not a particular set 
of facts falls within the section’s scope. For the purposes of this discussion, the full clause is set 
out below: 
‘(1) In this section and in section 197A -  
(a) ‘business’ includes the whole or a part of any business, trade, undertaking or service; and  
(b) ‘transfer’ means the transfer of a business by one employer (‘the old employer’) to another 
employer (‘the new employer’) as a going concern.’  
 
Section 197(1) defines the two factors that must be present in order for the section to apply. First, 
the Act defines a ‘business’- stating that the entity being transferred must include ‘the whole or a 
part of any business, trade, undertaking or service’.
43
 Secondly there must be a ‘transfer’ of a 
business by the old employer to the new employer.
44
 As will be discussed below, section 197(1) 
is the threshold which determines the applicability of section 197 to a transfer of a business. The 
vague drafting language used in section 197(1) has resulted in courts and labour tribunals 
grappling with the correct manner of interpreting the clause.
45
 The Act is silent on what actually 
constitutes a ‘transfer as a going concern’, which has been left to the courts to give substance to. 
The confusion is particularly exacerbated when the business involved in a transfer is part of an 
outsourcing contract.
46
 Therefore, the efficacy of section 197 is potentially compromised by the 
lack of clarity on when the section should or should not apply. 
                                                        
43
 Section 197(1)(a). 
44
 Section 197(1)(b). 
45





The threshold test in section 197(1) removed the common law requirement of consent by the 
employees in order for the legal consequences in section 197(2) to take place. In this regard, 
section 197 is a legislative exception to the common law principle that a contract of employment 
may not be transferred without the employees’ consent.
47
 This is unlike Section 197(1) of the 
1995 LRA, which stated that a contract of employment ‘may not be transferred from one 
employer (the old employer) to another employer (the new employer) without the employee’s 
consent.’
48
 Under the new LRA, employees are therefore unable to disturb the legal effects of 
section 197 by refusing to be transferred, as their consent is not necessary for the section’s 




2.2.2. Legal consequences of section 197 
Section 197(2) sets out the legal consequences of section 197 when applied to a transfer of a 
business as a going concern. First, the new employer automatically substitutes the old employer 
in respect of all employment contracts in existence immediately before the transfer.
50
 Secondly, 
all rights and obligations between the old employer and employee at the time of transfer are 
transferred to the new employer,
51
 unless the business is insolvent.
52
 Thirdly, any legal action 
carried out by the old employer before the transfer will be considered as carried out by the new 
employer,
53
 except in insolvent circumstances.
54
 Finally, the business transfer will not interrupt 
                                                        
47
 Van der Velde v Business & Design Software (Pty) Ltd & another (2006) 10 BLLR 995 (LC), at para 22. 
48
 The inclusion of this phrase resulted in confusion pertaining to whether or not consent of the employee was a 
trigger mechanism for the application of the section.  
49
 C Bosch, ‘Balancing the Act: Fairness and Transfers of Businesses’ (2004) 25 ILJ 923, at 936. 
50
 Section 197(2)(a). 
51
 Section 197(2)(b). 
52
 In insolvent circumstances, section 197A(2)(b) applies and the rights and obligations remain with the old 
employer. 
53
 Section 197(2)(c). 
54
 If the business is insolvent, section 197A(2)(c) applies and anything done by the employer before transfer remains 
an action carried out by the old employer. 
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The consequences discussed above came into effect after some amendments were made to the 
LRA in 2002.
56
 The inclusion of the word ‘automatically’ in subsection 2(a) was a conscious 
effort by the Legislature to clarify the confusion surrounding whether or not consent of the 
employers or the employees was necessary for the section to apply.
57
 Prior to the amendment, the 
Court in Foodgro, A Division of Leisurenet Ltd v Keil
58
 spoke on why section 197(2) should be 
interpreted in a manner that provided for the automatic transfer of employment contracts, once 
the requirements in subsection (1) were met. Froneman DJP (for the majority) held that the 
Legislature obviously intended for section 197(2)(a) to apply automatically because: 
‘If the purpose was to make it as easy as possible for purchasers to acquire a business from another 
without incurring obligations to existing employees, the introduction of s 197 would have been 
unnecessary. The common law would have created adequately for that situation.’
59
 
 Subsections 2(b) and (c) of the current LRA state that all rights, obligations and actions 
pertaining to the old employer in respect of the employees become those of the new employer 
after transfer. Thus, an employer cannot shirk responsibilities owed to the employee, as they 
survive a change in the employer’s identity. Furthermore, liability for unfair labour practices or 
dismissals carried out by the old employer is passed on to the new employer as if the latter 
employer committed the acts personally. The section thus prevents old employers from using 
business transfers as a means to circumvent liability for unlawful conduct, such as in the Kebeni 
case.
60
 Subsection 2(d) ensures that an employee’s continuity of employment is not interrupted 
                                                        
55
 Section 197(2)(d). 
56
 Through the Labour Relations Amendment Act, No 12 of 2002. 
57
 Supra note 3 para 65. 
58
 (1999) 20 ILJ 2521 (LAC). 
59
 Ibid at 2526. 
60
 M Wallis op cit note 10  at 784. 
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by a change in employers. This consequence is particularly important when construed in light of 
pension benefits or long-service rewards.
61
  
Section 197 states that ‘unless otherwise agreed’, the consequences in subsection 2(a) to (b) take 
place. This has been misconstrued as implying that section 197 only applies when there is prior 
agreement by the transferor and transferee that the workers are ‘part and parcel of the 
transaction.’
62
 This was eventually overruled by the Constitutional Court (CC),
63
 which held that 
once the conditions in section 197(1) are met, the effects of subsection 2 follow by necessary 
implication.
64
 Therefore the simultaneous transfer of a business and contracts of employment 
does not require any declaration by a court.
65
 The transfer occurs by operation of law, and 
irrespective of the wishes or intentions of the parties.
66
 An employee who refuses to be 
transferred to the new employer thus only has resignation as an alternative.
67
 An old employer 
therefore cannot offer individual employees a choice between transfer to the new employer or 
retrenchment by the old employer.
68
 However, section 197(6) introduces an element of flexibility 
by allowing the employee to enter an agreement with the employer(s),
69
 and effectively alter the 
consequences of section 197(2).
70
 This was confirmed in the recently decided case of Experian 
                                                        
61
 See AST Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Roos (2007) 10 BLLR 891 (LAC), at 898. 
62
 NEHAWU v University of Cape Town & others (2002) 23 ILJ 306 (LAC), at 313. 
63
 Supra note 3. 
64
 Supra note 3 para 64. 
65
 Aviation Union of SA & another v SA Airways (Pty) Ltd & others (2012) 3 BLLR 211 (CC), at 43. 
66
 Franmann Services (Pty ) Ltd v Simba (Pty ) Ltd & another (2013) 34 ILJ 897 (LC), at para 7. 
67
 C Bosch op cit note 49 at 936. 
68
 In Fourie & another v Iscor Ltd (2000) 21 ILJ 2018 (LC), employees refusing to have their contracts transferred 
in a business transfer were offered a choice between transfer, or staying with the old employer and facing 
retrenchment. The Court chose not to pronounce on the legality of this action (as it was not raised in pleadings). 
However, Damant AJ at para 8.14 remarked that the respondent (employer) could have compelled the employees to 
transfer against their consent, given the automatic nature of section 197. However, this case was decided before the 
2002 amendments, which effectively established that retrenchment is not an option for employees in the transfer 
context. 
69
 Subsection (6) allows the agreement to be entered by the employee and either the old or new employer, or both 
employers. 
70
 C Bosch op cit note 49 at 936 
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South Africa (Pty) Ltd V Haynes & another.
71
 The Court discussed the effect of ‘unless otherwise 
agreed’ in section 197(2)- stating that the consequences imposed by the subsection flow 
automatically, subject to the creation of a section 197(6) agreement between the employee and 
either of the employers.
72
 Therefore nothing in section 197(2) prohibits the concluding of a fresh 
agreement that regulates the rights and obligations in an employment relationship after the 
transfer of the employee to the new employer.
73
 However, this must be construed in light of the 
proviso established by the Court in Foodgro that no agreement in terms of section 197(6) may 
result in the forfeiture of an employee’s period of service.
 74
 
The Court in Experian also held that section 197(2) must be read together with section 197(3)(a), 
which allows the new employer to unilaterally change the terms and conditions that are, ‘on the 
whole on the whole not less favourable to the employees than those on which they were 
employed by the old employer.’
75
 This section is a clear attempt by the Legislature to balance the 
employer’s rights to structure his business in a manner that is commercially efficient, and to 
protect employees’ fair labour practice rights by requiring a standard of fairness when doing so.
76
 
The phrase ‘on a whole not less favourable’ is not defined in the Act. It is thus difficult to 
establish when the conditions are less favourable enough to invoke section 197(3)(a). Some 
scholars have ascribed terms and conditions such as medical and pension benefits as factors 
which can be used to assess whether employment contracts have been altered by the new 
employer to the employees’ detriment.
77
  
Section 186(1)(f) provides protection to an employee who terminates their employment contract 
when a new employer provides them with ‘conditions or circumstances at work that are 
substantially less favourable to the employee than those provided by the old employer.’ This 
                                                        
71
 2013 (1) SA 135 (GSJ). 
72
 Ibid para 27. 
73
 Ibid para 29. 
74
 Supra note 58 para 25. 
75
 This is subject to section 197(3)(b), which prohibits any terms and conditions agreed upon in terms of a collective 
agreement  with the old employer, from being altered by the new employer. 
76
 Supra note 3 para 34. 
77
 C Bosch, ‘The Employee's Right to Procedural Fairness in the Context of Transfers of Businesses’ (2009) 30 ILJ 
2253, at 2263. 
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amounts to a constructive dismissal, and provides an additional safeguard for employment 
security by linking section 197 to the unfair dismissal clauses.  However, comparable to the 
wording of section 197(3), what is ‘substantially less favourable’ in section 186(1)(f) is open to 
interpretation, and might prove difficult to prove. Thus the provision could be abused by 
unscrupulous employees, and therefore might not serve the purpose the drafters wanted it to.  
3. Chapter Two- The purpose of section 197 
The analysis of section 197 above alludes to the intent behind its enactment, particularly when 
considered with regard to the preceding common law discussion. This section discusses the 
purpose of section 197, as set out by South African courts in further detail.  
The purpose of the LRA is set out in section 1. The Act seeks to advance economic development, 
social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace. In furtherance of this 
purpose, the first object of the Act is to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights 
conferred by section 23 of the Constitution.
78
 Secondly, the Act must give effect to obligations 
incurred under the International Labour Organisation (ILO).
79
 Thirdly, the Act must provide for 
collective bargaining, in promotion of, inter alia, employee participation in workplace decision-
making,
80
 and the effective resolution of labour disputes.  
When analysing the purpose of the LRA, one of the most important considerations to take into 
account is the role of the LRA in respect of the constitutional right to fair labour practices.The 
South African Constitution has a unique feature in constitutionalising the general right to fair 
labour practices through section 23(1).
81
 However, this clause does not elaborate on what this 
right entails, leaving it to national legislation to give content to this right. The LRA was 
consequently enacted in order to give effect to this right.
82
 Section 23(1) of the Constitution 




 Section 1(b). 
80
 Section 1(d)(iii). 
81
 Supra note 3 para 33. 
82
 Harsco Metals South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another v Arcelormittal South Africa Ltd and others (J2923/11) (2011) 
ZALCJHB 116, at para 12. 
19 
 
affords ‘everyone’ the right to fair labour practices; which means that employers and employees 
alike enjoy protection of this right under section 23 and the LRA. Consequently, the purpose of 
the LRA is to maintain a healthy balance between the inherent conflicts of interests that 
characterise the labour relations sector. The apparent incompatibility of employers’ and 
employees’ interests is only exacerbated in the business transfer context.
83
 Therefore, the 
purpose of section 197 needs to be extrapolated from this state of affairs. 
Thus there was a dichotomy regarding the purpose of section 197, prior to the CC judgement in 
NEHAWU.
84
 One group argued that the main purpose of the section is to facilitate business 
transfers.
85
 The second group argued that the purpose of section is to protect employment 
security in the event of transfer. 
86
 Consequently, the CC recognized that the core of business 
transfer disputes is a conflict between an employer’s interest in the profitability, or efficient 
disposal of the business; and the employee’s interest in job security.
87
 Therefore the purpose of 
section 197 ‘lies somewhere in-between’ the two opposing interests.
88
 The Court identified the 
dual purpose of section 197 as the medium that seeks to both facilitate sales of businesses as 
going concerns and protect the employment of the workers concerned.
89
  
3.1. The employer’s interests 
It is trite to state that an employer’s interests in a business are commercially inclined. The 
average employer is predominantly concerned in the profitability, efficiency or survival of the 
business. On the other hand, an employer who fails to achieve any of the aforementioned goals, 
or seeks to pursue a different venture, would in the very least strive for the effective disposal of 
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 It would also be in a prospective new employer’s interests for the sale of the 
business to be a swift and efficient process.
91
  
Under the common law, this was not the case, as the old employer had to terminate the 
employment contracts and carry out retrenchment proceedings and make severance payments to 
the employees. If the employer sought to retain (part of) the workforce, lengthy employment 
contract novation negotiations would ensue.
92
  Therefore, the Explanatory Memorandum of the 
draft Labour Relations Bill stated that by providing for the automatic transfer of employees, 
section 197 would facilitate the employer’s interests by removing the common law effects of 
business transfers,
93
 which inhibited commercial transactions. The fact that Section 197 does not 
require the employee’s consent prior to transfer also minimizes the potential tension and labour 
disputes which would ordinarily arise in business transfers.
94
 New employers in skill, technology 
and machine –based industries are particularly benefitted, as they do not have to seek or train 
new employees. Old employers also do not have to (nor are they allowed to) resort to 
retrenchments in order to make a business appear more commercially-appealing to prospective 
buyers. 
The role of section 197 in catering to employers’ commercial interests was recently discussed in 
the Johannesburg High Court.
95
 The Court held that the imposition of a restraint of trade 
agreement by a new employer soon after a business transfer did not infringe section 197(2) if 
such an agreement was non-existent with the previous employer.
96
 The inclusion of section 
197(3)(a) of the LRA allows for a new employer to unilaterally change the terms and conditions 
of the employment contract if they are ‘on the whole note less favourable’ to employees than the 
previous employment contract.
97
 Therefore the Mbha J stated that section 197(2) must be read 
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with section 197(3)(a), which allows employers to protect their commercial interests by altering 
the terms and conditions of transferred employees’ contracts.
98
 The Court also held that imposing 
a restraint of trade agreement after transfer is permissible, given that in casu, the employee 
‘consensually and voluntarily’ entered a fresh agreement regulating their rights and obligations.
99
 
This dictum does raise potential issues however, as the extent of voluntariness on the employees’ 
part is questionable. This will be discussed below.
100
 However, the important principle raised in 
this judgment is that the purpose of section 197 is not to thwart the employer’s commercial 
interests, and as a matter of fact, provides for the protection thereof. 
3.2. The employee’s interests 
One cannot sufficiently articulate the importance of protecting employment security without 
analysing the context within which this need exists. Although section 197 was drawn from 
foreign law, the effects of South Africa’s political and social history on labour relations today are 
unique.
101
 Therefore the purpose of the provision needs to be analysed with cognisance of the 
vulnerable position of the employee in South Africa.  
Racially exclusive legislation,
102
 enacted by the apartheid government meant that black 
employees were predominantly unskilled labourers who did not enjoy any statutory entitlement 
to employment security or fair labour practices.
103
 Even upon the abolishment of the racial 
dichotomy in labour relations legislation,
104
 the social effects of the apartheid government 
remained.
105
 Unskilled labourers were predominantly uneducated black people from 
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disadvantaged backgrounds, who were desperate for employment in a climate where there was a 
scarcity of job opportunities.
106
 Employees are therefore easily replaceable, as the number of job-
seekers far outweighs the job opportunities available.
107
 Therefore, employers in South Africa 
wield a lopsided amount of economic power due to the inequality that characterises employment 
relationships in developing economies.
108
 
It is a well-established socio-economic fact that an individual employer represents an 
accumulation of material and human resources. Therefore, in this context, an employer is a 
‘collective power’.
109
 Thus, the employment relationship is typically a relationship between a 
bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power.
110
 Therefore, the CC held in Sidumo & 
another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others that the LRA serves as a countervailing force 
to counteract the inequality of bargaining power inherent in the employment relationship.
111
 The 
LRA is thus an example of ‘protective legislation’, which seeks to maintain a balance between 
those who yield an abundance of power; and those who have none by infusing law into a 
relationship of command and subordination. It is in this context that it must be understood.
112
 
Prior to the enactment of section 197 of the LRA, the characteristically unenviable position of 
employees was worsened when business transfers were regulated by the common law. As 
discussed above,
113
 there was no employment security because the default consequence of a 
business transfer was the termination of employment contracts. It is in this light that the purpose 
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of section 197 in protecting employees’ interests needs to be construed. Consequently, one of the 
most drastic effects of section 197 is the link it bears to the automatically unfair dismissals clause 
in the LRA. Section 187(1)(g) states that a dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer 
dismisses an employee because of a transfer, ‘or a reason related to a transfer, contemplated in 
section 197 or 197A.’ The phrase ‘a reason related to a transfer’ is wide enough to encompass a 
wide range of scenarios. This clearly seeks to overturn the common law position, as well as to 
avoid the use of ‘sham transactions’ to deprive employees of their statutory rights.
114
 
 Even after the enactment of section 197, it is a social reality that employees are still relatively 
powerless against their employers in the bargaining arena. Therefore it is worrying when courts 
ascribe epithets such as ‘consensual and voluntary’ to decisions made by employees in a transfer 
context. For example, section 197(3) allows for the unilateral change of terms and conditions of 
the employment contract by a new employer subsequent to transfer. However, the Legislature 
counterbalanced this right by imposing a fairness requirement, that the changes cannot be on the 
whole less favourable to the employee. Therefore, the right to fair labour practices is not 
compromised. Furthermore, in terms of section 186(1)(f), it amounts to an unfair dismissal if an 
employee terminates an employment contract because the new employer provided him or her 
with conditions that are substantially less favourable to the employee in comparison to those 
provided by the old employer. Hence the CC has stated that the proper approach to the 
construction of section 197 is to meet the purpose of protecting workers against loss of 
employment in substance as well as in form.
115
  
3.3. Employers versus employees: Whose interests prevail? 
The dictum by the CC in NEHAWU on the twofold purpose of section 197 may lead to the 
question: are the interests of employers and employees to be protected equally by the courts? In 
response to this question, some scholars firmly assert that the fact that section 197 is dual in 
purpose does not mean that the interests of the employers and the employees should be weighed 
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 This assertion is implied by the statement by Ngcobo J that it cannot be gainsaid that, 
‘an important purpose of section 197 is to protect the workers against the loss of employment in 
the event of a transfer of a business.’
117
 Furthermore the judge held that this conclusion is 
strengthened, ‘not only by the effect of the section, but also by the very fact that the section was 
inserted in a chapter that deals with unfair dismissal.’
118
 The Court also drew authority from 
international legislation. The preamble of the EEC Directive 77/187
119
 states that the Directive 
provides for the ‘protection of employees in the event of a change of employer, in particular, to 
ensure that their rights are safeguarded.’
120
 Therefore there is a general recognition that 
employee rights deserve stronger protection in some circumstances; and in the case of business 
restructuring, employees are usually the vulnerable parties. 
The LAC in Aviation Union
121
 interpreted the twofold nature of section 197 as defined by the CC 
in such a way that effectively narrowed the scope of the facilitation of business transfers. The 
Court held that the role that section 197 plays in facilitating business transfers must be construed 
as meaning that the new employer would not have to look for workers who would do the work; 
nor will it have to train new recruits for work that they have not done before. Section 197 
therefore assists new employers by allowing for the automatic transfer of employees who have 
been doing the work and have experience in the work. However, the rights of employers should 
not be undermined or disregarded, as the LRA involves a ‘complex balancing exercise of the 
rights of employers and employees.’
122
 Therefore, the mandate on courts to protect the 
vulnerability of employees needs to be construed in this light. 
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4. Chapter Three- Interpreting section 197 
The ‘golden rule’ of statutory interpretation
123
 is that the ordinary meaning of words should be 
given effect to when interpreting a statutory provision. This paper attempts to illustrate how 
section 197 is quintessentially ambiguous,
124
 which raises questions of how the golden rule 
applies, given the problematic wording of the section. Thus this chapter discusses how South 
African courts have developed the principles of statutory interpretation in situations where the 
golden rule yields problematic results.  The question of how the enactment of the 1993 
Constitution affects the manner in which section 197 should be interpreted is also addressed. 
4.1. Statutory interpretation 
The locus classicus for statutory interpretation in South Africa is Venter v R,
125
 where the Court 
held that the aim of interpretation is to ascertain the Legislature’s intention from the language of 
the statute.
126
 The Court held that to garner the Legislature’s intent, one must: 
‘take the language of the instrument, or of the relevant portion of the instrument, as a whole; and, 
when the words are clear and unambiguous, place upon them their grammatical construction and 
give them their ordinary effect.’
127
  
The Court nonetheless acknowledged that ‘no matter how carefully words are chosen’, language 
is inherently difficult to define precisely. Therefore, as an exception- one can depart from the 
plain meaning of words in a statute if giving them their ordinary meaning, ‘would lead to an 
absurdity so glaring that it could never have been contemplated by the Legislature.’
128
 The SCA 
reaffirmed this dictum in Ngcobo and others v Salimba CC; Ngcobo v Van Rensburg.
129
 The 
majority judgment by Oliver JA did, however, develop the golden rule to the extent that a 
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provision should be read in its context
130
 and with due regard to the objects of the statute, where 
the ordinary meaning yields absurd results.
131
. 
Olivier JA added that the golden rule could be departed from, if the ordinary meaning resulted 
not only in absurd results, but also where it would render the provision unconstitutional or 
contrary to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights in terms of section 39(2) of the 
Constitution.
132
 Drawing from this judgment, de Ville comments that principles of statutory 
interpretation should thus be derived from the Constitution.
133
 Therefore, interpretation should 
shift from the notion of searching for the Legislature’s intention, to a notion of ‘an enforcement 
of constitutional values.’
134
 This is particularly relevant when interpreting section 197(1)(b) in 
the outsourcing context, where the meaning of the word ‘by’ has been intensely debated.
135
 No 
argument has been raised in this debate that the reliance on the ordinary meaning of the word 
‘by’ would result in an absurdity. It has however, been argued that the necessity for a transfer to 
be carried out ‘by’ an old employer in section 197(1)(b) may fall short of the constitutional 
mandate placed on the LRA  to protect the employee’s right to fair labour practices.
136
 And so, it 
is submitted that section 197 cannot be adequately interpreted without contextualising the section 
according to its purpose and role in the new constitutional dispensation.  
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4.2. Linking the LRA and the Constitution 
As discussed above,
137
 the purpose of the LRA is to give effect to the constitutional right to fair 
labour practices. The conceptual nexus between section 23 of the Constitution and the LRA must 
therefore be borne in mind when the question of how to interpret any provision within the Act 
arises.
138
 Accordingly, the CC pronounced on the impact of the Constitution on the interpretation 
of the LRA.   
The NEHAWU decision was handed down at a time when the correct interpretation of section 
197 was highly contested.
139
 With this in mind Ngcobo J stated that the question regarding the 
correct interpretation of section 197 was a constitutional issue.
140
 The Court reaffirmed that the 
LRA was enacted to promote section 23 of the Constitution, which is of great importance in the 
interpretation context. For this reason, Ngcobo J cautioned that the interpretation of the LRA 
must be carried out in a manner consistent with that purpose.
141
 One of the core principles raised 
in this judgment was therefore, whenever the provisions of the LRA are in dispute, the statute 
must be ‘purposively construed’ in light of its relationship with section 23 of the Constitution.
142
 
A purposive interpretation moves away from the ‘traditional’ approach to interpretation of 
statutes, where the ordinary and literal meaning of the statute was the main interpretive tool.
143 
 The CC revisited the question of the correct interpretation of the LRA shortly after NEHAWU. 
The Court elaborated on what a purposive interpretation would entail in NUMSA & others v 
Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd & another.
144
 The Court, per O’Regan J held that a purposive interpretation 
of the LRA requires due regard being given to the purpose of the Act, as set out in section 1.
145
 
The interpretations clause in the LRA instructs that whenever the Act is interpreted, effect must 
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be given to its primary objects.
146
 Furthermore the interpretation must be in compliance with the 
Constitution,
147
 as well as the public international law obligations incurred by South Africa.
148
 
With regard to the Constitutional aspect of interpreting the LRA, O’Regan J held that the 
interpretations clause in section 39(1) of the Constitution must be given effect to. Therefore, 
when interpreting the LRA the promotion of values which underlie ‘an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom’ is imperative.
149
 Furthermore, courts 
‘must consider international law,’
150
 and may consider foreign law.
151
 
The Court also held that if the LRA is capable of a broad interpretation, which does not limit any 
other fundamental human rights, that interpretation should be preferred.
152
 The principles set in 
Bader Bop not only served as a guideline to the correct interpretation of the LRA; they also 
helped to bridge the gap between the Constitution and the LRA. The LRA therefore cannot be 
interpreted in a vacuum, given the role it plays in South Africa’s constitutional democracy. 
However, the Court also held that due deference must be given to legislative intent if the 
intention is to limit certain rights on a justifiable basis.
153
 This finding is particularly important in 
reference to section 197, which potentially limits the freedom of either employees to consent to 
transfer, or of employers to choose who to employ.  
4.3. The role of international and foreign law 
In NEHAWU, the CC held that in interpreting and giving content to the LRA, courts have to seek 
guidance from domestic and international experience.
154
 As a ratified member State of the ILO, 
South African Courts are explicitly mandated by the LRA to interpret the Act in compliance with 
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the obligations incurred from this membership.
155
 However, the international guidelines which 
regulate business transfers are not found in the ILO Conventions. Section 197 was drawn from 
English and European law,
156
 whose principles South Africa has no obligation to apply.
157
 
However, the interpretational guidelines of section 39 of the Constitution need to be borne in 
mind, especially when there is a constitutional right at stake. Nevertheless, section 197 was 
evidently drafted with the principles set in the European business transfer statutes in mind.
158
  
Therefore, in the pursuit of applying a purposive interpretation to the LRA, foreign law should 
be given regard in order to give substance to issues that need clarification.
159
 For example, the 
following interpretation of the Acquired Rights Directive
160
 given by the ECJ is a useful 
summation of how to interpret business transfer provisions purposively.  
‘The objective of the Directive is to ensure as far as possible the continuation without change of the 
contract of employment or the employment relationship with the transferee in order to avoid the workers 
concerned being placed in a less favourable position by reason of the transfer alone.’
 161 
The South African courts have accordingly followed suit, relying extensively on the 
interpretation of English and European statutes to give content to section 197.
162
  
Despite the important role that foreign law plays in interpreting section 197, resorting to 
comparative analyses has been described as ‘dangerous’, in the absence of sufficient awareness 
of the differences in language, context and the purpose of section 197 to its foreign 
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 Therefore the value of foreign law should not be overstated. The courts need to 
bear in mind that although similar to the European Directive, section 197 is not cast in identical 
terms.
164
 It would be a ‘fundamental error’ to elevate foreign jurisprudence to the status of a 
clear guide to the content of our law.
165
 Kahn-Freund spoke at length about the need to trace a 
hypothetical line, ‘which separates the use of the comparative method in lawmaking from its 
misuse.’
166
 He commented that it is only ‘in the most exceptional cases that the institutions of 
one country could serve those of another at all.’
167
 Furthermore, Kahn-Freund argues that the 
unique nature of each country’s political regime stands as the biggest obstacle to ‘legal 
transplantation’.
168
 Therefore, it is submitted that courts should apply foreign law as an advisory 
mechanism that would facilitate a purposive interpretation of section 197. Used in this manner, 
full effect can be given to the purpose of section 197 in light of the stated need for employment 
protection in European and English law.  
5. Chapter Four- The application of section 197 
The adoption of a purposive and encompassing interpretation of section 197 is a crucial element 
in ensuring adequate protection of employees in business transfers. However, this has proven to 
be an idealistic notion, as various obstacles have arisen in the section 197 jurisprudence, and 
have beleaguered courts attempting to apply section 197 to a given set of facts.  The discussion 
below illustrates the various challenges presented by the applicability inquiry of section 197.  
Three factors trigger the application of section 197. There must be an existing business (or part 
thereof); a transfer of the business by one employer to another; and a transfer carried out as a 
going concern.
169
 The LC has cautioned that the questions of whether there has been a transfer of 
a ‘business’ and whether the transfer was carried out as a going concern are two separate 
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questions, and to confuse or conflate them could possibly defeat the purpose of section 197.
170
 




5.1. What is a ‘business’ under section 197? 
Todd et al have suggested that there are three reasons why the identification of an entity as a 
business for the purposes of section 197 is important.
 172
 First, as stated in section 197(1)(a), the 
section may only be applied in cases where an entity constitutes a business as defined. Secondly, 
it is only upon the proper delineation of the entity as a business that can one establish which 
employees are connected and therefore, affected by an impending business transfer. Thirdly, the 
factual inquiry of whether there has been a transfer as a going concern can only be answered by 
an analysis of the components of a particular business. Identifying what amounts to a business is 
therefore important, although courts tend to skim over analysing whether an entity constitutes a 
business in a fair amount of cases.
173
 Therefore, the case law does not give an adequately 




Section 197(1)(a) does not assist in clarifying what a business is by defining the term. Instead, it 
states that a business includes,
175
 ‘the whole or a part of any business, trade, undertaking or 
service.’ This imprecise definition has been taken to indicate the legislative intent for the section 
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to have a wide embrace.
176
 The wide scope of subsection (1)(a) is also supported by the fact that 
‘any part of’ the listed items can constitute a business for the purposes of section 197. 
Furthermore, the use of the words ‘undertaking’ and ‘service’ indicates that section 197 is 
applicable to structures that fall outside of income-generating entities.
177
 The CC has held that 
the section applies to, ‘any business provided that the other requirements are met. The aim is to 
cast the net as wide as possible.’
178
 
Identifying an entity as a business is a fairly straightforward process when an entire business is 
transferred as a going concern. But the enquiry is complicated and requires deeper analysis when 
only a part of a business is transferred.
179
 It becomes necessary to analyse whether the part being 
transferred has features that would sufficiently constitute a business for section 197 purposes.
180
 
There is no statutory guidance on what these features are or should be, although case law has 
attempted to flesh out the defining features of a business. Courts consequently have to examine 
the factual matrix of each case to establish whether or not an entity can be identified as a 
business for the purposes of the section.
181
 
As a point of departure, a business is typically identified by the existence of certain features, 
such as goodwill, operational resources or a workforce.
182
 There can be no closed list of features 
to identify a business;
183
 giving courts sufficient room to scrutinise entities in each case and 
reach a conclusion. However, the composition of a business is a dynamic concept, which 
changes according to modern developments, and may possess considerably less features 
traditionally used to identify a business. In Schutte v Powerplus Performance (Pty) Ltd & 
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 Seady J described an entity that is ‘severable from the entire business’ as capable of 
being a business for section 197 purposes.
185
 This ‘entity’ must therefore have sufficiently linked 
components that are structured in a way that makes them identifiable as such.
186
 The Court in 
Schutte therefore followed the guidelines set by a landmark ECJ case on transfers of 
undertakings,
187
 which described an entity as ‘an organised grouping of persons and assets 
facilitating the exercise of an economic activity, which pursues a specific objective.’
188
 Wallis 
succinctly states that section 197 comes into play whenever there is the transfer of, ‘an 
identifiable component or unit of a business, be it a division, a branch, a department, a store or a 
production unit.’
189
 The ECJ has also held that the activity carried out by the entity may still be 
identified as a business, even if it is only ancillary to the main object of the business.
190
 Thus the 
entity need not be profit-generating.
191
 
The discussion above raises the general principles which can be used in identifying a business 
for purposes of section 197. These guidelines are particularly necessary when attempting to 
apply section 197 to outsourcing contracts. In light of the purpose of section 197 as discussed, it 
is submitted that these guidelines should be used as a means to include rather than restrict non-
traditional forms of business from the scope of the provision. An analysis of whether South 
African courts have taken these considerations into account when developing the concept of 
employee protection under section 197 will consequently ensue in the next chapter.  
5.2. What constitutes a transfer as a going concern? 
The requirement of the transfer of a business as a going concern as set by section 197(1)(b) is 
arguably the most contentious clause that courts have sought to interpret and apply in business 
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transfer litigation. However, the sweeping consensus in South Africa is that, upon satisfying the 
requirements set in section 197(1)(b), the application of the entire section is activated; thus it is 
treated as the trigger-mechanism for section 197.
192
 The discussion below will separate the 
notions of ‘transfers’ and what constitutes a ‘going concern’ for the sake of clarity. 
5.2.1. Which transactions amount to a transfer? 
The complete lack of definition or guidance by the Legislature on which legal transactions 
constitute a transfer can be described as a mixed blessing. On one hand, the undefined concept of 
a transfer allows for a liberal and purposive interpretation of the word, providing for a wide 
range of transactions (that may have been excluded by definition) to satisfy the requirements set 
by section 197. On the other hand, the lack of definition has resulted in unnecessary litigation, 
where parties contest whether a certain transaction amounts to a transfer. In f173, the LC was 
presented with the herculean task of interpreting section 197 for the first time. The Court set a 
helpful precedent that has been widely accepted in subsequent business transfer cases. There was 
no sale of the business being transferred in casu;
193
 therefore the question was whether a 
transaction other than the sale of a business could qualify as a transfer under section 197.
194
 
Seady AJ held that the application of section 197 was not limited to sales of businesses alone.
195
 
A transfer under section 197 can be a range of legal transactions such as a merger, takeover, 
restructuring within a company, and an exchange of assets or a donation.
196
 Drawing from the 
interpretation of article 1(1) of Directive 77/187/EEC
197
 by the ECJ, Seady AJ held that an 
analysis of the substance rather than the form of the transaction is necessary when determining 
whether a transfer has taken place.
198
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The finding in Schutte was endorsed in by the CC in NEHAWU,
199
 and has essentially been 
accepted as the cornerstone of applying section 197 to a set of facts. In Aviation Union,
200
  the 
CC followed this line of reasoning and rejected the dependence on the label of the transaction 
effecting transfer by the court a quo.
201
 The Court held that in identifying whether there has been 
a transfer, one must determine this with reference to the objective facts of the case.
202
 The 
substantive interpretation and application of a business transfer is particularly necessary in cases 
where employers attempt to side-step the obligations imposed by section 197 by transferring the 
business in a transaction that they claim falls outside of the scope of the provision. Therefore, it 
is submitted that courts should avoid categorising transactions into compartments that either 
constitute business transfers or do not, as this would be in conflict with the stated purpose of the 
section in respect of employee protection. 
It has been suggested that what is ultimately important in the applicability inquiry of section 197 
is that the transaction in question has the effect of transferring a business as a going concern- and 
how that occurs is of no real significance.
203
  Once this view is adopted, the requirement for 
ownership of a business to be transferred from the old employer to the new employer for there to 
be a transfer will be eliminated by necessary implication. Furthermore, the requirement for a 
contractual link between the transferor and the transferee will also be eliminated.
204
 
However, at the other end of the spectrum, some limits should be placed on the scope of the 
section by courts in order prevent unnecessary litigation, and to avoid an ‘opening of the 
floodgates’ effect.
205
 Employers should not also be over-burdened with the obligation to take on 
the workforce of a previous employer where the facts of the case do or should not amount to a 
transfer of a business. Of course, such limits can only be established and developed with time by 
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the courts, as legislative exclusions usually have the adverse effect of formal interpretation and 
rigid application, to the detriment of the excluded groups. For example, in the recently decided 
case of Long v Prism Holdings Ltd and another,
206
 the LC held that the acquisition of shares of 
one company by another does not constitute a ‘takeover’ of business as a going concern.
207
 
Citing Todd et al,
208
 the Court held that it is clear from the wording of section 197 that the old 
employer and the new employer must be two separate entities.
209
 In such cases, control is shifted 
but, in light of the concept of separate legal identity, the legal identity of the employer remains 
the same.
210
 Therefore, the principles set in Schutte
211
 need to be borne in mind each time the 
applicability of section 197 is raised against a set of facts. 
5.2.2. Establishing a ‘going concern’ transfer 
One can justifiably attribute the inclusion of the words ‘as a going concern’ as a prominent factor 
that hinders the efficacy of section 197. The question of what makes a transfer a going concern 
has not, and cannot be answered definitively. The enquiry will always have to be fact-dependent, 
meaning that disputes surrounding section 197 will often require litigation. The applicability of 
the section turns on this clause, which can only be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. 
Accordingly, there is now an array of available tests, formulated by judges in order to determine 
whether there has been a going concern transfer. The discussion below will consider some of 
these tests, and whether they sufficiently provide for the balanced and purposive application of 
section 197. 
Speaking for the majority of the CC in NEHAWU,
212
 Ngcobo J held that because ‘going concern’ 
is not defined in the LRA, it must be given its ordinary meaning, unless the context indicates 
otherwise.
213
 In attempting to comprehend what the ordinary meaning of a going concern entails, 
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the LAC in SAMWU v Rand Airport Management Co (Pty) Ltd & others
214
 stated that the 
starting point of any going concern enquiry must be the minority judgment handed down by 
Zondo JP in the LAC leg of the NEHAWU v University of Cape Town litigation.
215
 The judge 
held that the going concern inquiry is an objective determination, where the ipse dixit of the old 
employer and new employer cannot be conclusive.
216
 A court faced with a business transfer 
would therefore have to look at the range of factors, and whether they point towards a going 
concern. An analysis of what would happen to factors such as the goodwill of the business; the 
stock-in-trade; the premises; contracts with clients; the workforce; the assets of the business, and 
the daily operation of the business after transfer is necessary.
217
However, the absence of any one 
of these factors should not be construed as destroying the status of the transfer as one of a going 
concern.  
The finding by the LAC in NEHAWU reaffirmed the Schutte judgment,
218
 where Seady AJ held 
that when attempting to evaluate the assets that typically constitute traditional businesses, one 
must appreciate that what comprises a business has changed greatly. Thus an approach that is 
cognitive of these changes should be adopted.
219
 For example, in the service sector the assets of 
businesses are often only in the form of intellectual property and intangible assets. In modern 
business structures, a strict application of the going concern test would essentially demarcate a 
line between asset and non-asset based businesses; with the latter businesses being effectively 
excluded from the protection offered by section 197. This is clearly an issue in attempting to 
apply section 197 in outsourcing cases. It is accordingly submitted that the various examples of 
factors that point towards a going concern transfer given by courts and scholars should be 
construed as nothing more than guidelines that can assist the interpretation of the going concern 
inquiry. 
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 the CC reiterated that the list of factors provided were neither exhaustive nor 
decisive in effect.
221
 However, the ‘NEHAWU test’ has been widely accepted in subsequent 
business transfer cases, and serves as a helpful guideline in determining the applicability of 
section 197 to a given scenario. The test was set out by Ngcobo J as follows: 
‘In deciding whether a business has been transferred as a going concern, regard must be had to the 
substance and not the form of the transaction. A number of factors will be relevant to the question 
whether a transfer of a business as a going concern has occurred, such as the transfer or otherwise of 
assets both tangible and intangible, whether or not workers are taken over by the new employer, whether 




The NEHAWU test has however been supplemented in circumstances where its application may 
yield inconclusive results. Thus, the ECJ judgment in Spijkers v Gebroeders Benedik Abattoir & 
Alfred Benedik En Zonen
223
 has been accepted in South African courts as authority on the 
interpretation of a going concern in business transfer legislation. The European Court of Justice 
held that a decisive criterion for establishing the existence of a going concern transfer is whether 
the entity in question retains its identity after transfer.
224
 Furthermore, the distinguishing feature 
should not be whether assets have been transferred, but whether what has been transferred is an 
economic entity which is still in existence, with the same economic or similar activities.
225
 This 
test has been referred to extensively and has helped to develop business transfer law in South 
Africa.  
However, in Harsco Metals South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another v Arcelormittal South Africa Ltd 
and Others,
226
 the LAC highlighted the difficulty in identifying an ‘economic entity’ in some 
businesses. Accordingly, the efficacy of the economic entity test was questioned when applied to 
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businesses that do not have discernable assets or employees.
227
 The LAC thus held that when 
establishing whether the transferred business retains its identity after transfer, the primary 
criterion is the nature of the business.
228
 This is because the nature of the business indicates the 
weight that needs to be attached to the factors that would point towards the identity of the 
business. Similarly in Spijkers, the ECJ held that to establish whether the transfer is a going 
concern or not, the full range of the circumstances of the transaction in question need to be taken 
into consideration.
229




The guidelines above have led to the formulation of a ‘snapshot’ test, where the entity prior to 
transfer (assessed in terms of all of its various components) is compared to the business after the 
transfer.
231
 Under this test, a business is transferred as a going concern where (after transfer) it 
‘remains the same but in different hands’.
232
 This test has been applied by the LC in analysing 
whether a franchise business can be transferred as a going concern from one franchisee to 
another.
233
 The snapshot test is easily satisfied when a franchise outlet is transferred; as the very 
nature of franchising requires uniformity in the operation of all businesses within a franchise 
network- regardless of the franchisee’s identity.
234
 However, this cannot be said for all 
businesses. Furthermore, business transfers are carried out for a variety of reasons (including 
failure by the old employer to run it successfully); thus the new employer cannot be expected to 
carry out the business in an identical manner to the previous employer.
235
 Therefore the snapshot 
test should be applied in a purposive manner that includes as many different types of business 
transfers as possible within the scope of section 197. It has been suggested that in order to 
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purposively apply this test, judges could adopt a lower standard that requires the transferred 
business to remain substantially the same.
236
  
6. Chapter Five- Outsourcing and section 197 
Thus far, this paper has discussed the purpose, interpretation and application of section 197 in a 
general context. Although many of the difficulties pertinent to the application of section 197 
have already been raised; it is when courts are presented with the task of applying the section to 
outsourcing cases that the conceptual issues reach their peak. This chapter analyses whether the 
application of section 197 to outsourcing cases sufficiently promotes the protection of 
employment security in the event of a transfer of a business as a going concern.  
6.1. What is Outsourcing? 
Wallis states that outsourcing is not a term of art. Instead, ‘its form is protean and the term is 
used to describe a range of very different transactions.’
237
Wallis also comments that outsourcing 
is ‘in’ whenever organisations perceive that it is to their advantage to engage in it.
238
 There are a 
range of reasons which attribute to this finding.
239
 Outsourcing is a viable option for many 
businesses for reasons such as the economic benefits of reduced overhead expenses involved 
with the outsourced service;
240
  management reasons;
241
 or for quality purposes.
242
 For example, 
in the milling sector, outsourcing has been used as an alternative employment structure because 
wage rates were too high, and outsourcing promoted employment flexibility by allowing for 
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labour to be supplied according to ‘peaks and troughs’ in the demand cycle.
243
 Therefore, the 
commercial rationale behind outsourcing is that the outsourced activity is provided more 
affordably and more efficiently by the external service provider.
244
 However, it is necessary to 
highlight one of the main incentives behind outsourcing, which is pertinent to the focus of this 
paper. Many employers choose to restructure their businesses and outsource because of the 
promise of reduced labour costs.
245
 An outsourcer will only be obligated to pay the outsourcee a 
fee to render the services outsourced, instead of paying wages to the employees who carry out 
the services.
246
 Therefore, the outsourcing party does not have the burden of paying fringe 
benefits to the outsourced employees, who become the staff of the new employer.
247
  It is also 
the new employer who bears the burden of administration.
248
  
Outsourcing contracts may be structured in a range of ways.
249
 For example, an employer could 
simply seek services from a commercial supplier already in the market. Whether this would have 
a significant impact on either party would then depend on the size of the contract.
250
 Another 
form of outsourcing can be found where former employees of a business have formed their own 
business, and contract to provide the services to their former employer.
251
 In some cases, there 
will be the need for assets, equipment and licenses to be transferred, while in others, nothing 
tangible will pass from the old employer to the new employer.
252
 In some outsourcing contracts, 
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the outsourcee would require access to the business premises of the old employer in order to 
perform the work as stipulated by the contract,
253
 whereas in other circumstances, the work may 
be done entirely from a remote location. Thus it is important to note that the legal consequences 
of outsourcing contracts vary widely, according to how the contract is structured to meet the 
needs of the outsourcing party.
 254
   
The structure and consequences of an outsourcing agreement become particularly important 
when the question of whether this amounts to a transfer of a business as a going concern by one 
employer to another is raised. As emphasised by the CC - the applicability of section 197 is fact-
dependent.
255
 Therefore an analysis of the outsourcing agreement, its structure, and its legal 
effects is necessary to establish the application inquiry.  
However, this inquiry is obscured by legal and commercial developments; where the basic forms 
of outsourcing contracts (as set out above) have been rendered ‘first-generation outsourcing’.
256
 
Consequently, a legal phenomenon called ‘second generation contracting out’ has manifested in 
courts and businesses alike. This genus of outsourcing takes place where there is a change in the 
provider of an outsourced service. This stems from the fact that it is an outsourcer’s inviolable 
right to have prerogative over who performs the service that has been outsourced.
257
 
Consequently, two sets of circumstances have generated the mass of outsourcing litigation under 
the business transfer jurisprudence. The first scenario is where a company that had outsourced 
services to an outsourcee places the opportunity to provide the service out to tender, when the 
initial contract comes to an end. The outsourcing contract then enters its second generation when 
the original outsourcee is unsuccessful in its bid to secure the contract for an additional term.
258
 
The second set of facts involves an outsourcer who becomes disillusioned with the service being 
rendered by the outsourcee. As the outsourcer has the right and power to cancel the initial 
outsourcing contract; the contract with the outsourcee is terminated, and awarded to another 
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 In both cases, the new outsourcee in effect steps into the shoes of the old 
(unsuccessful) outsourcee, and takes over the operation of the relevant services.
260
 Therefore, 
another characterising feature of outsourcing contracts is that they are very rarely permanent. 
Furthermore, the outsourcer generally retains a degree of control over the performance of the 
outsourced services.
261
  These factors have been interpreted by some as reasons which count 
against the application of outsourcing contracts to section 197.
262
 
The question which has consequently arisen is whether there can be a section 197 transfer 
between the outgoing outsourcee and the incoming outsourcee. Put differently, does second 
generation outsourcing constitute a transfer as contemplated by section 197 of the LRA?
263
 The 
discussion below evaluates how South African courts have approached the question of the 
suitability of section 197 in the outsourcing context, with regard to both first and second 
generating contracting out. 
6.2. Defining a business in the outsourcing context 
The 2002 amendments to the LRA
264
 introduced a legislative guideline on what could qualify as 
a business for the purposes of section 197, by way of subsection 1(a). The section was worded in 
such a manner that allowed for a very wide range of entities to fall under the scope of the section, 
including a service. However, the meaning of the word ‘service’ in regard to outsourcing cases 
has been highly contested. The courts have are yet to set authoritative and uncontested guidelines 
on whether services really do amount to businesses under section 197. Although courts have 
attempted to set some instructive precedent on the matter, the correct interpretation of the 
judgments themselves are contested. 
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Can a service amount to a business?  
The problem with establishing whether a service is business in terms of section 197 arises from 
the fact that the traditional tests for determining whether something is an ‘economic entity’ or 
‘organised grouping of persons and assets',
265
 are difficult to apply (or are less efficient) in 
typical service cases. Not only do service-based entities characteristically perform non-core 
business activities, but they often have no tangible assets; and may only comprise of employees 
and the skills they provide. At other times, service-based entities amount to nothing more than 
the function that they perform.
266
 Therefore, the ECJ cautioned that an entity cannot be reduced 
to the activity entrusted to it.
267
 Factors outside of the services performed by an entity must exist 
in order to ascertain whether a transferred entity retains its identity.
268
 
Prior to the promulgation of the 2002 LRA amendment, the question of whether an outsourcing 
agreement could amount to a transfer in terms of section 197 was answered by the LAC,
269
 
which set a strict test to determine what type of businesses could fall under its scope.
270
 The 
Court held that only an entity with assets (movable and immovable, tangible and intangible) used 
to generate profit, or to attain the goals of the undertaking, can be a business.
271
 This was 
contrary to the principles set by the first section 197 case, where the LC was willing to recognise 
entities that had little to no assets, and that performed non-core functions as businesses in terms 
of the section.
272
 The LAC leg of NEHAWU therefore planted the root for the formalistic and 
form-over-substance application of section 197. And so, even subsequent to the 2002 
amendment, judicial preference of the narrower interpretation of ‘service’ still existed. Thus, in 
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SAMWU v Rand Airport Management Co, 
273
 the LC held that the addition of the word ‘service’ 
did not extend the scope of section 197 to outsourcing contracts, but merely clarifies the position 
that a business may consist mainly, or only of the rendering of services to another.  
The LC referred to an article by le Roux-
274
 which stated that the fact that a business had been 
defined to include a service by the amendment did not necessarily entail that the outsourcing of 
services amounted to a transfer of a business as a going concern.
275
 Thus the Court found that the 
outsourcing of gardening services in casu could not constitute a business, as the outsourcer had 
merely contracted certain services out to a contractor.
276
This reasoning was thus accepted as 
authority that outsourcing agreements were excluded from the scope of section 197. This is 
unfortunate because, despite the narrow interpretation given to the word ‘service’, the Court did 
concede that whether or not an outsourcing service could be a business was a question of fact.
277
 
However, the Court did not embark on a factual inquiry, and relied on the narrow definition of a 
business as set by the LAC in NEHAWU.
278
 Thus the ‘non-core’ cleaning, gardening and security 




However, upon appeal by SAMWU to the LAC,
280
 the Court gave effect to the interpretational 
principles set LC in Schutte,
281
 and held that any doubt that an outsourcing contract could fall 
under section 197 was removed by the inclusion of the word ‘service’ in subsection (1)(a) from 1 
August 2002.
282
 Applying the ordinary dictionary meaning of ‘service’,
283
 Davis AJA found that 
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the gardening service in casu amounted to a business in terms of section 197 despite the fact that 
it did not have any assets, goodwill, operational resources to be transferred to the new 
employer.
284
 Reliance was placed on the content of the contract, whose terms and conditions 
created rights and obligations fit within the ordinary meaning of the word ‘service’. This 
judgment was a clear attempt by the LAC to foster a permissive interpretation of section 197, 
and allow a wide range of entities to constitute a business that is capable of being transferred as a 
going concern. In Aviation Union,
285
 the CC emphasised that although the word ‘service’ was 
included in section 197(1)(a), what is capable of being transferred is the business that supplies 
the service, and not the service itself.
286
 The Court held that were it to be otherwise, a 
termination of a service contract, and the subsequent appointment of another service would 
constitute a transfer within the contemplation of the section; which was not the purpose of the 
section. This dictum could be interpreted as an attempt by the CC to provide some constraints to 
the potentially over-broad application of section 197 subsequent to the decision by the LAC in 
Rand Airport Management,
287
 although this was not said explicitly.  
Finally, pronouncing on the art of distinguishing between a mere service and a business, the 
majority judgment in Aviation Union stated that if the old employee or outsourcing institution 
did not offer the service from the outset, the service cannot be said to be a business or part 
thereof.
288
 This dictum potentially creates excludes all outsourcing ventures where the service 
was not carried out by the outsourcing business before. This would particularly affect parties 
involved in a second generation outsourcing contract, where the initial outsourcing contract was 
not a service that was offered by the outsourcer. It is submitted, with respect, that this part of the 
judgment is rather disconcerting in light of the endorsement by the CC of a purposive approach, 
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where the substance of each case is analysed on the basis of the factual matrix of each case.  
Thus, soon after Aviation Union was decided the LAC sought to clarify the meaning behind this 
part of the CC judgment in Harsco Metals.
289
 The Court held that: 
 ‘What Yacoob J does not say, and could never be interpreted to say, is that unless there was a s 197 
transfer from an outsourcing party to the first contractor there could never be a subsequent transfer from 




The Court added that a general exclusion of that nature would be flawed, and the correct 
approach is for a court to scrutinise the transaction in question, and the factual circumstances 
surrounding it to determine whether the application of section 197 is triggered.
291
 It is submitted 
that although a decision in the LAC cannot, by the procedural rules of South African courts, 
overrule a CC judgment, the approach taken by the LAC in Harsco Metals is in conformity with 
the principles of the purposive interpretation of section 197. A blanket exclusion of service-based 
entities would not only leave employees working for such businesses vulnerable to employment 
loss whenever the outsourcing is contemplated- but the employers themselves will be deprived of 
the smooth transfer process guaranteed by section 197. 
The LAC also endeavoured to give content to how one could determine whether a service 
amounts to a business in terms of section 197, and underscored that the ‘economic entity’ test as 
set out by the ECJ in Spijkers
292
 may be ineffective when applied to a business that only 
comprises the provision of services.
293
 The LAC thus referred to the ECJ judgment in Suzen v 
Zehnacker Gebaudereinigung GmbH Krankenhausservice,
294
 which would be more instructive in 
cases involving entities that are characterised by the activities they carry out, more than the 
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 The LAC held that although the ECJ judgments were useful, the Court was 
nevertheless bound by the Rand Airport Management judgment.
296
 Therefore, Van Niekerk J 
held that if the transfer of a group of relatively unskilled workers and the work they perform, 
with no assets involved were found to be sufficient to constitute a business by Davis AJA in 
Rand Airport Management, ‘then it is difficult to conceive, in the context of an outsourcing 
transaction, of an economic entity that would not be capable of transfer in terms of the 
section.’
297
 Based on this ground, the inquiry of whether a service amounts to a business came to 
an end. 
However, it should be noted that outside of the strictures of the rules of precedent, Van Niekerk J 
has openly criticised the approach taken by the LAC in Rand Airport Management, which he has 
described as being ‘overly generous’. In his article,
298
 Van Niekerk raises concerns with the fact 
that the LAC judgment could be interpreted to mean that any service, or provision thereof, 
constitutes a business capable of being transferred as a going concern without any further 
enquiry.
299
 He argues that although a service can be a business for the purposes of section 197, in 
some circumstances, the whole or part of a business that carries out a service might not meet the 
threshold requirements that ought to define a business.
300
 Davis AJA did not follow any of the 
tests that had been set by the labour courts, the CC, or foreign courts such as the ECJ.
301
 Instead, 
the applicability of section 197 to the gardening services was based on whether the contract 
qualified as a ‘service’ in the ordinary meaning. In response to this, Van Niekerk argues that it is 
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not sufficient to consider that because the nature of the operation concerned fits comfortably into 
the dictionary definition of a service, a business exists for the purposes of section 197.
302
 
Although the LAC decision in Rand Airport Management was not per se incorrect, there was a 
lack of a substantive analysis of the facts before the Court. As mentioned above,
303
 when faced 
with outsourcing cases, there is a trend where courts gloss over the ‘business’ inquiry and focus 
more on the going concern question. Had the LAC launched into an appropriate query on 
whether there was a business, it would have been apparent that the service-related component in 
neither the gardening nor security services was determinative.
304
 Instead, a full investigation by 
the Court as to whether any components of a business existed would have been more appropriate. 
These components can fall within the range of assets, goodwill, a workforce, premises, the 
activity performed and operating methods.
305
 It is submitted that these guidelines provide for a 
comprehensive fact-based inquiry, which investigates whether a service amounts to a business in 
the outsourcing context. The examples of business components provided set the foundation for a 
wide range of services to fall within section 197, as the criteria are not limited to commercial or 
tangible assets alone. Therefore, the approach advocated by Van Niekerk allows for a balance 
between giving effect to the purpose of section 197 in relation to employee interests, and 
interpreting and applying section 197 in a manner that is justified by sound reason and 
consideration of the need to maintain a balance between employee and employer interests. 
However, the courts are yet to follow this line of reasoning and flesh out the principles 
surrounding the application of section 197 to services adequately. Therefore, the true meaning of 
the word ‘service’ has been left in the arena of academic debate, until it is finally resolved. 
The disjointed precedent regarding the implications of the inclusion of services to section 197 
has thus led to the demarcation between those who believe that services contracts fall within the 
scope of the section, and those who seem to oppose it. One of the more authoritative figures 
falling within the latter group is Wallis, who has expressed dissatisfaction with the interpretation 
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of service-based business cases under business transfer jurisprudence. Wallis states that the 
inclusion of the word ‘service’ does not extend the scope of section 197 from its prior position in 
the 1995 LRA. Instead, he accredits the inclusion as a means to avoid the contention that a 
university or similar (non-commercial) institution is not a business.
306
 Wallis reasons that, ‘one 
cannot extrapolate from the inclusion of a service in the definition of business an intention to 
bring within the operative portion of s 197 a contract for the provision of services.’
307
 However, 
he subsequently distinguishes between a ‘contract for the provision of services’ and outsourcing 
contracts;
308
 as he states that in cases involving the latter, it is never in question that at least one 
(and usually both) of the parties are a business in terms of section 197. However, Wallis does not 
set out what factors point towards an outsourcing contract, as opposed to a mere service contract. 
It is submitted that Wallis’ argument could be interpreted as to mean that section 197 should not 
apply to situations involving the contracting out of services that have no distinguishing features 
to establish an (economic) entity, outside of the activities carried out.
309
 If this is the case, then it 
is up to the courts to set out the threshold for when a set of facts or circumstances surrounding a 
service would amount to a business.  
Regarding the development of this particular debate, it is submitted that the dual purpose of 
section 197 must be borne in mind at all times when attempting to apply its provisions. Although 
the primary purpose of section 197 has been established as the protection of employees affected 
by a potential business transfer by guaranteeing employment security, it is necessary to decide 
whether there is a business to begin with. Not every service or the contracting-out thereof should 
fall under the scope of section 197. Thus, courts should take note of the warning by the LC in 
Schatz v Elliott International (Pty) Ltd & another
310
 that it does not automatically follow that, 
‘any transaction conveniently described as ‘outsourcing’ immediately and automatically triggers 
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the application of section 197.’
311
Employers should not be encumbered with the onerous effects 
of section 197 every time a service within a business is contracted out to a second party, because 
there is no need to facilitate a business transfer where there is no such business. Hence, the 
elevation of the inclusion of the word ‘service’ to a determinative factor, as opposed to its 
illustrative role by the LAC effectively (although inadvertently) resulted in a form-over-
substance approach.
312
 Judicial clarification on how to apply section 197 to services by the courts 
is necessary in order to end the confusion surrounding the clause. The courts need to develop a 
threshold test that goes beyond the going concern inquiry.
 313
  It is also submitted that the labour 
courts and tribunals should endeavour to set a coherent precedent in order to avoid the resort to 
expensive and time-consuming litigation in the High Courts, SCA or CC. 
6.3. Distinguishing between bleached skeletons and vibrant horses:
314
 How to 
apply the ‘going concern’ inquiry in the outsourcing context 
In what has been labelled a ‘quaint but memorable description’,
315
 the LAC held that likening the 
transfer of a going concern to a transaction without any accompanying transfer of employees was 
tantamount to ‘equating a bleached skeleton with a vibrant horse.’
316
 Subsequent to this finding, 
the debate of when the contracting out of a service would go beyond the ‘bleached skeleton’ 
form, and meet the threshold requirements to qualify as a transfer of a going concern persisted. 
Thus, the amount paid to the definitional clause in section 197(1)(b) by courts in outsourcing 
cases is unsurprising. The various tests that have been formulated by courts in order to conclude 
that there has been a transfer of a business as a going concern have been set out above.
317
 
However, whether they serve any purpose in the outsourcing context is debatable. The discussion 
below will attempt to extrapolate some guiding principles that have been used by courts to 
supplement the going concern inquiry in outsourcing cases. 
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In an attempt by courts to ascertain when and how a transfer of a service constitutes a going 
concern in the outsourcing context, a lengthy history of litigation ensued after the LAC’s finding 
in NEHAWU. As discussed above, the Court held that employees are a vital component in every 
business, and in labour-intensive industries, the major asset. Thus, a transfer of a business 
without the simultaneous transfer of most or all of the employees cannot be said to be a going 
concern.
318
 It is respectfully submitted that reducing the essence of a going concern transfer to 
the fact that a workforce was simultaneously transferred with the entity is not only restrictive, but 
counterintuitive. This ignores the heterogeneous nature of individual businesses or undertakings, 
especially in service-based entities. The minority judgment per Zondo illustrates this by stating 
that there will be cases where the transferor and transferee agree that the workforce will be taken 
over by the transferee, but the transaction itself cannot be described as a going concern transfer. 
319
 Conversely, a transfer devoid of such an agreement, or where the parties agree not to transfer 
the employees, may still qualify as a transfer as a going concern because of the presence of the 
other factors surrounding the transfer. This dictum therefore moves away from the definitive and 
rigid application of section 197, which had the effect of excluding outsourcing contracts from the 
ambit of its protection. The objective determination of whether a transfer is a going concern 
therefore requires an examination of whether the type of agreement, if implemented, would 
attract the application of section 197 based on the factors before the Court.
320
 And so, whether or 
not a workforce is transferred should not be a decisive factor. 
The CC has cautioned against the reliance that courts seem to place on the existence of an 
agreement to transfer employees subsequent to a business transfer- even if it is considered 
amongst a range of other factors. In Aviation Union,
321
 Yacoob J held that one of the reasons 
why section 197 provides for the automatic transfer of employees was to provide for situations 
where the business was transferred as a going concern, but the employees were not.
322
 Hence, if 
all the employees involved in a transferred business were transferred to the new employer, the 
section 197 inquiry would become irrelevant. Yacoob J therefore concluded that section 197 only 
                                                        
318
 Supra note 62 para 11. 
319
 Supra note 62 para 65. 
320
Supra note 214 para 33. 
321
 Supra note 65 
322
 Ibid para 112. 
53 
 
has application where, on a proper construction of a transaction, the business is transferred as a 
going concern without the concomitant transfer of employees.
323
 Although it is submitted that 
this dictum should not be interpreted as creating a hard and fast rule regarding the applicability 
of section 197,
324
 it does reduce the degree of relevance placed on whether employees have been 
transferred in such an inquiry. This finding also alleviates the plight of employees of an old 
employer in cases where outsourcing or transfer contracts explicitly assert that the employees 
will not be transferred to the new employer. Instead of being viewed as a factor counting against 
the applicability of section 197, the inclusion of ‘anti-transfer clauses’ in agreements expressly 
providing for the transfer of a business as a going concern will be construed as a contravention of 
the provision.  
The minority judgment in Aviation Union held that the express declaration by parties that an 
outsourcing contract would amount to a transfer as a going concern would constitute ‘sufficient 
proof of the fact’.
325
 The minority added, however, that silence on the matter would not disprove 
the existence of a transfer as a going concern. It is submitted that this dictum should be read with 
the understanding that it has been accepted in South African courts that the intention of the 
transferor and the transferee should play a minor role in determining the relevance of section 197 
to the transaction.
326
 Consequently, it is questionable whether the description of a transaction as a 
‘transfer as a going concern’ by the parties involved should be construed as ‘sufficient proof of 
the fact’. This paper suggests that courts avoid reliance on the alleged form of the transaction, 
and maintain a substance-based factual analysis. 




 Yacoob J added that the purpose of this part of his judgment was not to supplant the test set by the CC in 
NEHAWU supra note 3. The NEHAWU test stated that factors relevant to whether a transfer of a business as a going 
concern has occurred include the transfer or otherwise of assets both tangible and intangible, whether or not workers 
are taken over by the new employer, whether customers are transferred and whether or not the same business is 
being carried on by the new employer. 
325
 Supra note 3 para 49. 
326
 See SAMWU others v Rand Airport Management Co (Pty) Ltd & others, supra, note 214 at para 32; Franmann 
Services (Pty ) Ltd v Simba (Pty ) Ltd & another, supra, at para 8; Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood & Allied 
Workers Union on behalf of Members v Hydro Colour (Pty ) Ltd & another, supra note 232 at 685. 
54 
 
Wallis opined that courts are not immune to the tendency to try to devise rules which will answer 
whether there has been a transfer of a business as a going concern.
327
 The question that arises, 
however, is how and when these tests should be applied. The NEHAWU test seems to be the 
cornerstone principle in the going concern inquiry, as it has been cited in almost every 
subsequent business transfer case. However, its shortcomings have been raised, with ensuing 
judgments amending it to fit within the outsourcing framework. Authors have also suggested 
different ways of ascertaining whether section 197 applies to a transfer of a business by means of 
contracting out.
328
 Nonetheless, it is submitted that there needs to be a shift from the test-based 
paradigm, to a more flexible and fact-based mindset by the courts. Although judges set these 
tests as a guide to determine whether or not there has been a transfer as a going concern, the rigid 
application of these tests has resulted in the state of flux that the meaning of section 197 is 
currently in. Therefore, the inquiry of whether or not an outsourcing contract (in the first or other 
generation) amounts to a transfer of a business as a going concern should always be determined 
with reference to the circumstances before the court. It is thus reiterated that judicial tests should 
be applied in a manner that serves as a guideline and not a checklist that determines whether a 
particular transfer qualifies under section 197 or not. 
6.4. Second generation outsourcing 
Second generation outsourcing occurs when an initial outsourcing contract terminates for 
whatever reason,
329
 and the outsourcing party awards a new service contract to a third party. The 
pertinent question arising from such a scenario is whether section 197 is applicable when the 
business is transferred to the new outsourcee. The inherently-complicated application inquiry is 
further complicated by technical obstacles such as determining the roles, rights and obligations 
of each of the three employers, should section 197 apply to the transfer.  
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6.4.1. Consequences of a tri-partite employment relationship on the 
applicability of section197 
Transfer by whom? Who is the old employer in second generation 
outsourcing? 
Section 197(1)(b) requires for a business transfer to be carried out by one employer (old 
employer) to another employer (new employer) in order for the section to apply. Although this 
requirement is easily met in ordinary business transfers or first-time outsourcing ventures, the 
meaning of the word ‘by’ is highly contested when the section is applied to a second generation 
outsourcing contract, where there are more than two employers involved. The question thus 
becomes whether section 197(1)(b) requires a positive act to be carried out by the old 
employer.
330
 This inquiry is additionally complicated by the question of who is the old employer 
when a new outsourcee is awarded a service contract that was once carried out by an old 
outsourcee. Furthermore, does the absence of a contractual nexus between the two contractors 
exclude second generation transfers from section 197? The discussion below attempts to 
determine whether the tri-partite nature of second generation transfers affects the applicability of 
section 197 to such cases. 
The first case that dealt with the application of section 197 to second generation contracting out 
was the LC judgment of COSAWU v Zikhethele Trade (Pty) Ltd & another.
331
 Although not 
significantly raised by the parties in casu, the Court stated that a strong argument could be made 
that section 197 does not apply to cases involving second generation contracting because the 
express language of subsection (1)(b) requires that a transfer be by one employer to another.
332
 
Thus under this line of reasoning, in a second generation contract- where there is no actual 
business transfer from the outsourcer to the new outsourcee, section 197 cannot apply. However, 
Murphy AJ held that placing emphasis on the word ‘by’ would amount to a literal interpretation 
of the clause, which would lead to the ‘anomaly’ that workers transferred as part of first 
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generation contracting out would be protected, whereas those in second generation transactions 
would not.
333




The judge also stated that a literal interpretation of the word ‘by’ could provide a mechanism for 
unscrupulous employers to circumvent the effects of the business transfers clause by creating a 
legal loophole in the case of second generation transfers.
335
 Therefore, in accordance with Todd 
et al,
336
 Murphy J reasoned that section 197(1)(b) might be better interpreted if the word ‘from’ 
was used in place of the word ‘by’,
337
 in order to avoid the interpretational challenge.
338
 This 
interpretation was drawn from European jurisprudence,
339
 and entails a two-phase transfer in 
cases involving second generation contracts. In the first phase, the contract is handed back to the 
initial old employer (the outsourcer) by the outgoing contractor; and in the second phase, the old 
contractor hands the contract to the new successful outsourcee.
340
 Murphy AJ endorsed this 
interpretation, as a pragmatic means to give effect to the interpretational mandate set by section 
39(2) of the Constitution.
341
 Thus the judge held that substituting the word ‘by’ with the word 
‘from’ would ensure equal protection of all employees faced with a transfer of a business.
342
 
Finally, Murphy J held that the absence of a contractual link between the old and new employer 
should not be a decisive criterion in the determination of whether a transfer falls under section 
197 or not.
343
 Instead, more focus should be paid to whether the undertaking has retained its 
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Soon after the Cosawu decision, Wallis raised a few concerns with the interpretation adopted by 
the Court.
345
 Firstly, Wallis states that the definition of a transfer in section 197(1)(b) only 
contemplates two positive actors in the process (the old and the new employer)- and no one else. 
The two-stage approach endorsed by the LC is criticised, as the author comments that there is no 
suggestion in the wording of the clause of ‘a transfer by inadvertence or of compulsory but 
helpless compliance by the old employer.’
346
 Therefore, the author states that the section does 
not apply when a contract for the provision of services between an outsourcing business and an 
outsourcee comes to an end and is awarded to a third party. This is because the use of the word 
‘by’ in the section entails that the old employer is a positive actor in the process.
347
 However, in 
practice, the outgoing outsourcee would not be a positive actor in the transfer to the new 
employer, and is unlikely to ‘extend a hand of congratulations to the winner and promise it every 
support.’
348
 Although this paper does not challenge the correctness of Wallis’ argument, it is 
submitted that the emphasis placed on the role of the ‘positive actor’ could imply an additional 
requirement in section 197(1)(b) that the transfer be a voluntary act by the old employer. 
Whether or not an unsuccessful outsourcee decides to consult its attorney to challenge the tender 
process (as Wallis suggests is a likely reaction) should not affect the applicability of section 197 
to the transfer to the new outsourcee. 
Wallis states that replacing ‘by’ with ‘from’ eliminates the positive role that the old employer 
plays in the transfer process, and reduces it to a passive position, where the unsuccessful 
outsourcee cannot fight ‘strenuously to resist it’.
349
 Once again, it is submitted that an 
outsourcee’s willingness (or lack thereof) for there to be a transfer to the new outsourcee should 
not be construed as a catalyst for the application of section 197. It is established that once the 
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conditions of section 197 are met, the consequences follow regardless of the intentions of the 
parties involved.
350
 Thus an outsourcee’s displeasure at losing an outsourcing contract should 
play no role in determining whether awarding a new contract to the new outsourcee amounts to a 
transfer of a business as a going concern. 
Another argument against the application of section 197 to second generation contracts is the fact 
that the Legislature chose to keep the word ‘by ’in section 197(1)(b), even after the 2002 
Amendment Act,  which sought to clarify some of the issues surrounding the interpretation of the 
section.
351
 Wallis states that the reason behind this was to maintain the balance in the protection 
of both employee and employer interests.
352
 This raises the issue of the dual purpose of section 
197, as set out by the CC.
353
 And so, Wallis asserts that the Legislature deliberately kept the 
word ‘by’ to limit the scope of the section to transactions where two parties decide to transfer a 
business as a going concern.
354
 In Aviation Union, the SCA judgment raised similar points, and 
found that a second generation transfer from A to C, or even from B to C, is not a transfer for the 
purposes of section 197.
355
 The Court held that interpreting ‘by’ in section 197(1)(b) as ‘from’ 
would disregard the words used by the Legislature, which would lead to uncertainty and a failure 
by courts to respect the doctrine of separation of powers.
356
 Thus, the deliberate use of the word 
‘by’ and the ‘plain and unambiguous’ language of section 197 indicates that there should be two 
positive actors in the transfer process, in order to give effect to the ordinary meaning of the 
section.
357
 The Court accordingly found that to read ‘from’ into section 197 would cchange the 
meaning of the section as a whole, and is contrary to the Legislature’s intention.
358
  
Although the rules of statutory interpretation do call for the ordinary meaning of a statute to be 
given effect to as far as is possible, this rule must be applied subject to the mandate set by section 
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39(2) of the Constitution.
359
 Thus a purposive interpretation of section 197 that sufficiently 
protects the constitutional right to fair labour practices should be preferred. The CC accordingly 
disagreed with the SCA when the matter was taken on appeal.
360
 The Court criticised the reliance 
on a single word to interpret an entire clause, stating that ‘undue emphasis’ was given to the 
meaning of ‘by’, with little regard to the context or purpose in which the section appears, or the 
purpose of the LRA as a whole.
361
 The CC identified the judicial focus on who was the transfer 
was carried out by, rather than what was being transferred, as a factor that obscured the inquiry 
of the applicability of section 197 to second generation outsourcing.
362
  
An important principle set by the majority regarding the role of each of the three employers in a 
second generation transfer, is that the concept of an ‘old employer’ and ‘new employer’ is not 
static. In this regard, it is necessary to set out how this principle would be applied in practice: 
‘In transfer one by A to B, A is the old employer, and B the new employer; in transfer two by B to C, B is 
no longer the new employer but the old one, and C becomes the new employer; and if transfer two is by B 
back to A, B will be the old employer and A, who had been the old employer in the first transfer, becomes 
the new employer in the second transfer.’
363
 
Thus the CC endorsed the two-phase approach set out by Todd et al, and the LC in COSAWU.
364
 
The fact that the old outsourcee in casu (LGM) would carry out the transfer by way of 
‘compulsory but helpless compliance’
365
 did not affect the inquiry. Furthermore, the lack of a 
contractual nexus between A and C had no effect on whether section 197 applies to second 
generation contracts. Yacoob J chose to interpret section 197(1)(b) in a manner that would give 
effect to its intended purpose, without resorting to a substitution of the word ‘by’ with ‘from’, as 
he held that ‘by’ must be given its ordinary meaning.
366
 Although it is difficult to declare that 
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this judgment put the debate surrounding the wording of subsection (1)(b) to an end, the CC 
judgment can be accepted as the most authoritative guideline regarding the matter. However, 
Wallis commented that the facts surrounding Aviation Union were ‘substantially different’ from 
the typical second generation outsourcing cases, ‘where services, such as cleaning, gardening or 
security, involving no transfer of assets, had been outsourced.’
367
 Thus there is a possibility that 
future courts could distinguish Aviation Union based on the fact that there was a transfer of 
assets and premises to the new employer by the outgoing contractor- LGM,
368
 which the latter 
was obliged to do by terms of the initial outsourcing contract with the outsourcer.
369
 This means 
that the ordinary meaning of the word ‘by’ could easily be applied in such a situation, where 
LGM was a positive actor in the transfer process (albeit, in terms of a contractual obligation) 
although the same cannot be said of second generation outsourcing cases such as those described 
by Wallis. This leads to the question of whether section 197 adequately serves its purpose in its 
current form, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
The discussion below, however, raises some general remarks made by the CC, regarding the 
legal distinction between first and second generation transfers.  
6.4.2. Does the distinction between first and second generation outsourcing 
serve any purpose? 
The distinction between first and second generation business transfers has played an important 
role in litigation surrounding section 197. This section examines how the courts have treated this 
theoretical distinction and applied it in practice. Furthermore, the question of whether the 
distinction serves any purpose will be addressed.  
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An important principle that emerged from the CC judgment in Aviation Union is that the 
question of the applicability of section 197 would be ‘misleading if it focuse(d) solely or mainly 
on the ‘generation’ of the transfer.’
370
 The Court furthermore stated that, ‘(i)t does not matter in 
principle what the 'generation' of the outsourcing is, or even whether the transaction is concerned 
with contracting out at all.’
371
 The true inquiry is whether there is a transfer of a business as a 
going concern by the old employer to the new employer, which the Court warned is a complex 
enough question to answer without the inclusion of generations of transfers. Furthermore, 
Yacoob J commented that what might be deemed a ‘first generation’ transfer might not fall under 
section 197, whereas ‘a ‘fifth generation’ outsourcing could be caught by the section if it is in 
reality the transfer of a business as a going concern.’
372
  
This finding is consonant with Wallis’ description of second generation contracting out as 
‘catchy but inaccurate’, phrase that describes nothing more than a decision by a party to change 
its supplier.
373
  Wallis warned against the form-based application of section 197 and argued that, 
‘(m)erely because there may have been some prior outsourcing decision by the principal does not 
make the change of contractor into an outsourcing of any generation.’
374
 The form of the 
transaction should never substitute the use of a comprehensive factual analysis of whether what 
is being outsourced is a business as a going concern. Importantly, Yacoob J stated in Aviation 
Union that, ‘it is quite impossible to determine in the air that a second generation outsourcing 
agreement does or does not amount to a transfer of a business as a going concern.’
375
 
The various tests used to establish a going concern transfer have been discussed above.
376
 
However, the test set by the CC in Aviation Union was specifically formulated with second 
generation transfers in mind, to determine whether there is a transfer by the old employer to the 
new employer as a going concern. The test is set out in full below: 
                                                        
370




 Ibid para 105. 
373
 M Wallis op cit note 163 at 2. 
374
 Ibid at 3. 
375
 Supra note 65 111. 
376
 See section 5.2.2. 
62 
 
‘Does the transaction concerned create rights and obligations that require one entity to transfer something 
in favour or for the benefit of another or to another?  
If so, does the obligation imposed within a transaction, fairly read, contemplate a transferor who has the 
obligation to effect a transfer or allow a transfer to happen, and a transferee who receives the transfer? 
 If the answer to both these questions is in the affirmative, then the transaction contemplates transfer by 
the transferor to the transferee. Provided that this transfer is that of a business as a going concern, for 
purposes of s 197, the transferee is the new employer and the transferor the old. The transaction attracts 
the section and the workers will enjoy its protection.’
377
 
It is restated that one must not place too much reliance on tests set by the courts as guidelines. 
However, they may be helpful when applied subject to the unique nature of each set of facts or 
business transaction placed before a court. 
The discussion above has alluded to the judicial preference for a fact-dependent interpretation of 
section 197, regardless of the generation of the business transfer. Therefore, an inevitable 
question that arises is whether the distinction between first and subsequent transfers is necessary 
at all. In the SCA leg of the Aviation Union case, the Court held that what has been termed a 
second generation outsourcing is ‘nothing of the sort.’
378
 The Court held that this is because 
when an outsourcing contract between an outsourcer and an outsourcee is terminated, the 
subsequent transfer by the outsourcer to a new outsourcee is no more than a new first generation 
transfer.
379
 Although the CC overruled the SCA judgment, this issue was not raised by the Court.  
The importance of the distinction between first and second generation outsourcing has not been 
discussed sufficiently in South African courts, as the main focus surrounds the effects of a 
transfer falling under either one. Although Wallis does not remark on the efficacy of the 
distinction, he comments that the conceptual difference between first and second generation 
outsourcing makes a difference in practice, ‘in the same way that it is helpful conceptually to 
know whether one is dealing with an apple or a pear.’
380
 In amplification, he comments that 
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although the difference does not seem to have any impact, ‘not to distinguish between different 
factual and legal situations is a recipe for disaster.’
381
 Although the correctness of this argument 
is not contested, it is submitted that a sufficient analysis of the factual matrix placed before a 
court should be an adequate means to determine when a change in the employer of a business 
amounts to a going concern transfer. How the labeling of a transfer according to its generation 
affects this inquiry is not immediately clear. 
Perhaps some of the difficulties faced by judges in interpreting section 197 could be overcome if 
every transfer was treated as a first generation transfer, as the tendency to apply new or different 
requirements for second generation contracts would be done away with. This paper does not 
suggest that removing the notion of second generation outsourcing would have a fundamental 
impact on the applicability of section 197. However, removing the distinction between first and 
second generation outsourcing may remove the conceptual hurdle that is inherent in the latter 
cases, and oftentimes obscures the true issues before a court. This paper has reiterated that the 
pivotal elements in applying section 197 to a set of facts are the facts before a court and the 
nature of the business being transferred. The importance of these factors can be easily lost when 
the inquiry turns to the generation of the transfer. Thus it is submitted that the protection of 
employees’ right to job security could be carried out more robustly if such interpretational 
obstacles were removed from the section 197 application inquiry. 
6.5. Can section 197 be applied to franchise businesses? 
Franchises are unique business structures, described in the Oxford English Dictionary as, ‘an 
authorization granted by a government or company to an individual or group enabling them to 
carry out specified commercial activities, for example acting as an agent for a company’s 
products.’ The franchisor thus grants a franchisee the right to conduct a business within their 
network, selling the franchisor’s products or services, and using their name. This section 
analyses whether upon the termination of a franchise contract, the subsequent transfer of the 
business to a new franchisee amounts to a transfer as a going concern in terms of section 197. 





The section will also address whether the legal principles governing business transfers though 
outsourcing contracts can be applied to the transfer of franchise businesses. 
There are four essential elements that characterise a franchise relationship.
382
  First, franchisees 
have a right to operate the franchisor’s method of business (usually including the licensing of the 
use of intellectual property rights and trade know-how). Secondly, there will be a distribution 
contract to sell certain types of products or services. Thirdly, the franchisee operates as an 
independent business (although this is subject to the terms of the franchise contract). Finally, 
there is direct or indirect financial remuneration paid to the franchisor for the right to conduct a 
franchise business. 
Therefore, a prominent feature of franchise businesses is the uniformity in the manner that 
business is conducted, and the types of products and services sold in each franchise outlet. The 
daily function of a franchise remains the same, regardless of the franchisee who is in charge of a 
particular outlet.
383
 If a franchise contract lapses or is terminated by the franchisor for whatever 
reason, the new franchisee who takes over the franchise essentially steps into the shoes of the old 
franchisee and continues to run the business in the exact same manner.
 384
  At the end of a 
franchise contract, a franchisee will usually vacate the business premises and leave the furniture 
and fittings on the premises behind.
385
 Many franchise contracts also make provision for 
‘handover plans’, whereby the old franchisee assists the new franchisee in acquiring the 
business. Furthermore, customers of the business are the customers of the franchise, and not the 
individual franchisee, as they are attracted to the name and reputation of the franchise- and not 
the identity of the employer.
386
 Therefore, the customers of a franchise will continue making use 
of the business, regardless of the change in the particular franchisee that runs the outlet. 
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The question that inevitably arises from this analysis is whether upon the termination of a 
franchise contract, the transaction subsequent to the creation of a new franchise contract amounts 
to a transfer in terms of section 197. Put in another way, does the outgoing franchisee transfer the 
business to either the franchisor or the incoming franchisee as a going concern? This question 
was brought before the LC, where the Court held that section 197 applies when a new franchisee 
takes over a business after the franchisor terminated a prior contract with the outgoing 
franchisee.
 387
 Applying the same reasoning as the LC in FAWU v Cold Chain (Pty) Ltd & 
another,
388
 De Swart JA used the ‘snapshot test’, where a snapshot of the entity’s components 
before the transfer is compared to the picture of the business after transfer.
389
 The Court found in 
casu that the business- a franchise outlet of the Cell C Provider Company, remained essentially 
the same after the transfer to the new franchisee from the old franchisee.
390
 The snapshot test 
revealed a ‘similar picture’ before and after transfer, as ‘the businesses remained located in 




 The Court also restated the importance of a purposive interpretation of section 197, and that the 
purposes of section 197 are not achieved by an interpretation, ‘that entails job losses or the 
termination of the continuation of the employment of the employees who moved with the 
work.’
392
 Thus the Court found that the exclusion of franchises from the scope of section 197 
would narrowly construe the provisions of the section and defeat its purpose in safeguarding 
employment.
393
 The matter was then taken on appeal to the LAC.
394
 Instead of applying the 
‘snapshot test’ to the case, Davis JA quoted the two-step test set by Yacoob J in Aviation Union. 
                                                        
387
 Supra note 233. 
388
 (2009) 30 ILJ 2919 (LC). 
389
 Supra note 233 at 2727. 
390
 The Court found that there was an outlet, selling cell phone contracts, airtime, providing for phone repairs or 
enquiries before and after the transfer. 
391




 Ibid  2729. 
394
 Supra note 382 
66 
 
Davis JA reasoned that in order to answer the question of whether franchise agreements satisfy 
the Aviation Union test, the nature and essential elements of franchise businesses would have to 
be analysed first.
395
 As illustrated above, the process that follows the termination of a franchise 
contract could easily be identified as a transfer of a business as a going concern. However, Davis 
JA stated that it is important to note that franchisees act in accordance to their franchise 
agreements.
 396
 A franchisee has to follow detailed instructions laid down in the franchise 
agreement, and operates as ‘a servant or employee’ of the franchisor in regard to the conduct of 
the business.
397
 Thus, the new franchisee’s continuation or operation of the business in 
essentially the same manner as the old franchisee is not an instance of a going concern transfer, 




Davis JA warned against applying the outsourcing jurisprudence to a franchise business because 
of the unique nature of a franchise relationship.
399
 The judge quoted an article by Woker,
400
 
where the author asserts that although they are independent entities, franchisees are not free to 
develop their businesses as they please. Franchisees ‘buy into the franchisor’s business model.’ 
The franchisor consequently exercises great control over the way that the franchisees operate.
 401
 
Therefore, franchisors usually dictate the location of the business; advertising and selling 
methods; the appearance of business premises; the types of products and services offered; book-
keeping methods; hours of business; appearance of staff; and product prices. This is known as 
‘business-format franchising’, where there is an ongoing business relationship between the 
franchisor and franchisee.
402
 Thus, although the transfer to a new franchisee seems to satisfy the 
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requirements in section 197(1), the distinctive nature of these business structures requires ‘great 
care’ before principles from outsourcing jurisprudence can be applied.
403
 
The Court found in casu, that the new franchisee had not acquired the business as a going 
concern from the old franchisee, because the termination of the franchise contract by the 
franchisor was actually a termination of the license to operate the business on the latter’s 
behalf.
404
 Thus, the Court found that such a contract could not be equated to an outsourcing 
agreement. There was no transfer of assets by the outgoing franchisee to the new franchisee that 
was comparable to the facts in Aviation Union. The new franchisee merely took over the right to 
conduct the business on the franchisor’s behalf.
405
 
The question that stems from this discussion is whether South African courts will exclude all 
franchise businesses from the scope of section 197, or whether there is a possibility for the 
section’s applicability to some franchise contracts. It is necessary to mention the difficulty in 
answering this question, as there is no other authority in South Africa regarding the applicability 
of section 197 to franchises outside of the two judgments in the PE Pack case. It is also 
submitted that the majority decision by the LAC in PE Pack does not seem to create a blanket 
exclusion, as Davis JA warned that ‘great care’ must be taken before applying section 197 to 
franchises.
406
 He did not however, state that this can never be done. 
The ECJ decision of Albert Merckx and Patrick Neuhuys v Ford Motors Belgium SA
407
 involved 
two employees (the applicants) who worked for a franchise outlet of the respondent company. 
Upon termination of the franchise contract with the applicants’ employer, the employees refused 
to be transferred to the new franchisee. They argued that they were not obliged to be transferred 
as there was no transfer of the business as a going concern in terms of the EEC Directive 
77/187.
408
 Interpreting the Directive in the context of its purpose to protect employees in the 
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event of a change of employer, the Court held that the change in franchisees amounted to a 
transfer as a going concern, meaning that the employees had to be transferred to the new 
franchisee.
409
 Applying a broad interpretation of the Directive, the Court found that it would 
apply ‘even if (the franchise) is carried on under a different name, from different premises and 
with different facilities.’
410
 A plausible argument could be raised that the interpretation of a 
going concern transfer by the ECJ in Mercxk was overly broad. However, the case serves as 
authority for the argument that a purposive interpretation of business transfers as a going concern 
allows for the application of transfer clauses to franchise agreements. 
It goes without saying that a transfer of a franchise business will usually satisfy the ‘snapshot’, 
‘economic entity’ and ‘same business but different hands’ tests because of the uniform nature of 
franchise businesses. However, one could argue that the Aviation Union test is also satisfied 
when a franchise contract obliges an outgoing franchisee to facilitate the handover of the 
business to an incoming franchisee.
411
 This does seem to ‘create rights and obligations that 
require one entity to transfer something in favour of another.’
412
 Consequently, a franchise 
agreement would also ‘contemplate a transferor who has the obligation to effect a transfer… and 
a transferee who received the transfer.’
413
 Furthermore, one of the decisive factors in the LAC’s 
judgment was the fact that, unlike the contract in Aviation Union, the franchise agreement was 
not worded in a manner that expressly provided for a transfer in terms of section 197, upon the 
cancellation of the contract.
414
 Although this paper submits that the form of a transaction (as 
stated in the contract regulating it) should not be a decisive criterion, if a franchise agreement 
contemplates the transfer of employees along with the other assets for the business, section 197 
could find application. The Court in PE Pack also found that the fact that the franchisor retained 
ownership of the entire business infrastructure and fixed assets indicated that there was never any 
transfer of the business.
415
 However, given the various forms of business arrangements, perhaps 
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section 197 could apply to a franchise agreement where the franchisee owns or controls (in the 
form of a lease) the business infrastructure, and transfers it to a new franchisee upon the 
termination of the initial contract.  
The final issue raised with the majority judgment in PE Pack is the fact that the Court placed so 
much emphasis on the nature of franchise contracts. There was no analysis of whether the 
wording of section 197 could provide for the inclusion of franchise businesses in its compass. 
Thus the majority judgment’s inquiry adopted a form-over-substance approach. The minority 
judgment provided a more objective factual inquiry that looked at the substance of the 
transaction, as required by the CC in NEHAWU.
416
 The majority raised the interpretational 
principles set by the CC, but did not actually apply them. Thus it is respectfully submitted that 
paying lip-service to interpretational guidelines and then focusing on the nature of a business to 
reach a conclusion might fall short on the mandate placed on courts to safeguard employment 
security in the event of business transfers.  
The future of the relationship between franchise businesses and section 197 is difficult to predict, 
as it is an area of law that is in need of further development. There are indications that count on 
both sides of the scale, and it is open to the courts to give more authority on the issue. It is 
submitted however, that creating a blanket exclusion based on the form of franchise businesses 
might be contrary to the purposive interpretation of section 197.  
7. Chapter Six- Does section 197 provide adequate protection to all 
employees in its current form? 
Thus far, this paper has analysed the issues surrounding the interpretation and application of 
section 197 in the range of circumstances that possibly fall under its scope. The wording of the 
section is undoubtedly problematic. It is clear that there will be a wealth of litigation surrounding 
business transfers in the foreseeable future, as the guidelines and principles set by the courts are 
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open to interpretation and debate. It is also common for loopholes within a statutory provision to 
manifest with the development of the area of law that the clause regulates. This discussion 
addresses the potential inadequacy of section 197 in its purpose to safeguard employment 
security that has manifested in case law and academic discussions. 
The issues surrounding the application of section 197 to outsourcing cases (and more 
specifically, second generation transfers), were commendably engaged by the CC in Aviation 
Union.
417
 However, Wallis raises the issue that the facts of the case were ‘substantially different’ 
from typical outsourcing cases in South Africa.
418
 Thus, it is not clear whether a court faced with 
a case involving a service-based business that is not employee-dependent, with little to no assets, 
or does not require occupation of the business premises, would find that section 197 applies. In 
Aviation Union, the Court held that the requirements of section 197(1)(b) are satisfied in a 
second generation transfer because the outgoing outsourcee transfers the business back to the 
outsourcer, who then (in his capacity as the old employer) transfers it to the incoming 
outsourcee.
419
 The two-phase transfer approach was an appropriate solution to the conundrum 
before the CC, because there were assets in the form of premises, infrastructure and machinery 
that needed to be transferred from one employer to the other. However, as in the typical second 
generation transfer cases, which mostly involve service-based entities, the transition from one 




In many second generation transfers, outsourcers advertise tenders and award new contractors 
before the existing contract expires or is terminated. Thus, the transition to the new outsourcee 
would occur swiftly upon termination, and without resort to a two-phase transfer as suggested by 
the CC. Therefore, in such circumstances, the outsourcer would not be the (old) employer of the 
affected workers, nor would they have effected any transfer.
421
 Although the outsourcer would 
cause the transfer to occur by terminating the initial outsourcing contract, the transfer would not 
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have been carried out by the outsourcer as the old employer.  And so, Wallis argues that the 
peculiar facts of Aviation Union do not alter the requirements of section 197(1)(b), but reinforce 
them, because South African Airways was the old employer after the contract with LGM was 
terminated, and before it was transferred to the new outsourcee. 
It is also important to recall that the CC rejected the substitution of the word ‘by’ with ‘from’, 
and held that ‘by’ should be construed according to its ordinary meaning.
422
 The case turned on 
the fact that the outsourcing contract contemplated a transfer as a going concern upon 
cancellation.
423
  Thus, to the extent that the wording of section 197(1)(b) requires the old 
employer to actively transfer the business, transfers of businesses that are structured differently 
to LGM in Aviation Union might be excluded from section 197. In consequence, despite the 
abundance of litigation surrounding the meaning of the word ‘by’, ‘(w)e are back where we 
started with a section that requires to be applied in the context of particular business 
transactions.’
424
 This resurrects a comment made in 2004 that section 197 is ‘arguably deficient’ 
to the extent that the old employer is required to play an active role in the transfer.
425
 Perhaps a 
constitutional challenge on the inadequacy of section 197(1)(b) in giving effect to the right to fair 
labour practices for employees involved in a second generation transfer should be raised.
426
 One 
could frame such a claim thus: section 197(1)(b), read in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
of ‘by’, is unconstitutional to the extent that it infringes the constitutional right to fair labour 
practices by excluding employees in second generation transfers. This is yet to occur in South 
African courts.  
Would a constitutional challenge against section 197 succeed?  
The Constitution is the supreme law in South Africa, and ‘any law or conduct inconsistent with it 
is invalid.’
427
 Any statutory provision which is inconsistent with the Constitution is of no force or 
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effect, to the extent that it is inconsistent.
428
 A court with constitutional jurisdiction may either 
invalidate or limit the unconstitutional provision.
429
 However, before any such order is made, a 
court has to carry out a limitations analysis in terms of section 36. This entails an inquiry of 
whether the statutory limitation of a right in the Bill of rights is ‘reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom...’
430
 The CC has 
held that this is established through the use of a two-stage test.
431
 The first stage inquires whether 
there has been a contravention of a guaranteed right. If yes, the second stage inquires whether 
such a contravention is justified under the limitation clause.
432
 
It is submitted that the section 36 analysis is difficult, if not impossible to apply to section 197. 
As this paper has endeavoured to illustrate, whether or not a particular business transfer falls 
under section 197 depends on the facts before a court. Reiterating a point made in Aviation 
Union, it cannot be determined ‘in the air’ whether a second generation transfer meets the 
threshold requirements in section 197(1).
433
 The section has been found to be applicable in some 
second generation outsourcing cases, where in other cases, it has not. The very nature of section 
197 calls for this determination to be made on a case by case basis, regardless of the type or 
generation of the transfer. There is no blanket exclusion of any particular type of transfer. 
Therefore, it is submitted that a court’s decision that section 197 is inapplicable to a particular 
case, based on the specific facts thereof, is not equivalent to a limitation of the right to fair labour 
practices in terms of a law of general application.  
An equality-based claim that  section 197(1)(b) indirectly discriminates against employees in 
second generation outsourcing transfers by requiring a positive act by the old employer is 
therefore also likely to fail. One cannot claim they have been discriminated against when the 
facts of a case fall short of the requirements set by section 197. It seems that the only remedy for 
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an unsatisfied litigant in either of the two scenarios set out above would be for the court’s 
interpretation of section 197 to be scrutinised by an appeal court.  
Wallis also raises some policy arguments against raising a constitutional challenge on section 
197. Firstly, he states that the challenge cannot be resolved by a simple claim that the 
constitutional right to fair labour practices of employees would be protected through the creation 
of a greater protection for workers affected by outsourcing.
434
 The constitutional right to fair 
labour practices is granted to ‘everyone’, and section 197 serves a dual purpose. Thus, a 
constitutional challenge on section 197 raises the question of how the extension of its scope 
impacts the balance of interests.
435
 If every outsourcing contract were to fall under the scope of a 
hypothetically amended section 197, employers could be overly burdened with the duty to retain 
employees in circumstances where neither law nor policy requires it.  
To claim that the purpose of section 197 is to protect employment security, without any reference 
to the employer’s countervailing rights is ‘superficial and inadequate.’
436
 This also raises a 
‘floodgates’ argument, where the extension of section 197’s application could lead to a surge in 
litigation to establish when it does not apply. An extension of section 197 could furthermore 
upset the sensitive nature of labour law- which balances ‘political and economic compromise 
between organised labour… and employers.’
437
 In this regard, Wallis comments that the 
Legislature deliberately chose the word ‘by’ in section 197(1)(b); and the fact that it has survived 
legislative amendment
438
 negates the suggestion that it is a ‘drafting oversight’.
439
 Courts would 
also be cautious to traverse into the territory of the Legislature by deciding on what is fair or 
unfair in ‘a matter of labour relations policy.’
440
 Thus, labour practices, the content of fairness, 
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and the mechanisms for determining fairness have been described as ‘political choices that ought 
to be left to the legislature.’
441
 
Wallis does nonetheless acknowledge the potential success of a constitutional claim that the 
LRA as a whole fails to give effect to the constitutional right to fair labour practices by failing to 
protect employment security in situations of second generation outsourcing.
442
 However, the 
author’s suggestion goes beyond the scope of section 197 or even employees involved in second 
generation outsourcing, as his inquiry questions the entire labour law framework’s adequacy in 
protecting fair labour practices.
443
 He argues that unless the entire framework is found to be 
inadequate first, a constitutional challenge will fail. However, the broad nature of this inquiry 
could potentially obscure or alter the issues raised in this paper, as it opens up the inquiry to the 
interpretation of every provision in the LRA. The bar for an order of unconstitutionality ‘is very 
difficult to clear’.
444
 Thus, it is difficult to envision the CC finding in favour of an applicant who 
claims that the wording of section 197(1)(b) is unconstitutional.  
8. Conclusion  
This paper has endeavoured to analyse whether the judicial interpretation of section 197 with 
particular reference to outsourcing cases upholds or subverts the provision’s purpose. Filling in 
the gaps left by the common law, the purpose of the section lies in between assisting employers 
by facilitating a smooth transfer process, and protecting the right of employees to job security in 
the face of a change in employer.
445
 However, where there is ambiguity when the section is 
interpreted, it is submitted that the protection of employment security should be given 
preference, as courts have a duty to balance the unequal distribution of power that characterises 
the employment relationship. Thus, when interpreting the section, a court should give due regard 
to the purpose of section 197, particularly in light of its role in giving effect to the constitutional 
right to fair labour practices. A purposive interpretation entails placing section 197 in the context 
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of the purpose of LRA as a whole; giving effect to the right to fair labour practices in section 23 
of the Constitution; complying with public international law obligations; and referring to foreign 
jurisprudence in areas of uncertainty. Furthermore, a purposive interpretation of section 197 
gives greater weight to the substance of the facts before a court, and not a form-based approach, 
where certain types of transaction or businesses (or part thereof) are excluded from the 
provision’s ambit. 
The inquiry of when section 197 applies has not been easy to carry out due to the incoherent 
manner in which the principles of interpretation and application have been set out by the 
judiciary. This paper does however acknowledge that section 197 is inherently problematic 
because it necessitates a case by case factual analysis; therefore one cannot set hard and fast rules 
on how to establish when the section’s requirements have been satisfied. This is best illustrated 
by the CC judgment in Aviation Union, which is currently the highest authority on the 
relationship between section 197 and business transfers through outsourcing. Despite the fact 
that the CC judgment instructed courts to interpret section 197 in a manner which purposively 
gives effect to the provision’s purpose in facilitating business transfers and protecting 
employment security, one cannot ignore that the particular facts of the case played the pivotal 
role in the case. 
The applicability of section 197 is dependent on there being a transfer of an identifiable business 
by the old employer to the new employer as a going concern. This can only be ascertained with 
reference to the facts of a case. One cannot adequately distinguish between cases that fall under 
section 197, and those that fall outside of its reach without a sufficient factual inquiry, especially 
when it involves an outsourcing business. In determining whether an entity amounts to a 
business, the various components of the entity need to be scrutinised in order to establish 
whether they constitute an entity which is capable of transfer. The nature of the entity is 
important in determining the weight to be attached to the presence or absence of certain 
components.  
It is also submitted that the word ‘transfer’ should be interpreted as generously as possible, as 
section 197(1)(b) allows for a wide range of transactions to fall within the provision’s scope. 
Section 197(1)(b) should be interpreted in  manner that gives effect to employees’ rights to 
employment security as much as is reasonably possible. However, it is submitted that the dual 
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nature of section 197 should always be borne in mind, and employers should not be over-
burdened with the obligations imposed by section 197 when the transfer does not amount to a 
transfer of a business.  
In deciding whether a transfer of a business is carried out as a going concern, courts should focus 
on the substance and not the form of the case. The transfer of assets and employees is 
inconsequential to the inquiry. Furthermore, whether the transfer was carried out in a first or 
second generation outsourcing contract are is of no relevance. This paper suggests that the 
distinction between first and second generation outsourcing should be done away with. As long 
as an entity capable of being a business is transferred to a new employer by the old employer, 
and it maintains its identity (with reference to the nature of the business) after transfer, there has 
been a transfer of a business as a going concern. The implication of this reasoning on the transfer 
of franchise businesses is not certain. This paper submits that although there may be room for the 
transfer of a franchise business by one outsourcee to another to fall under section 197, the law 
currently indicates that such businesses fall outside the scope of section 197.
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This paper submits that the claim that section 197 in its current form is inadequate is misplaced. 
The true problem is the absence of a sound line of precedent on how to interpret the section. It is 
suggested that the solution does not lie in replacing ‘by’ with ‘from’. A construction of a 
statutory provision by a court would not be reasonable if it is reached ‘only by distorting the 
meaning of the expression being considered.’
447
 The fact that the word ‘by’ has been kept by the 
Legislature also indicates that the use of the word is not the problem where the applicability of 
section 197 is concerned. Furthermore, the hypothetical amendment of section 197 to explicitly 
include first or subsequent generation outsourcing contracts will not reduce the difficulties in 
applying the section. The inquiry will still have to be factually dependant, with certain cases 
falling outside the zone of applicability. Thus, it is submitted that the future of the efficacy of 
section 197 in protecting employee’s rights to job security rests with the courts. A constitutional 
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challenge is unlikely to succeed, and legislative amendment of the provision is clearly not on the 
Legislature’s agenda. 
In summation, this paper suggests that the purpose of section 197 is subverted to the extent that 
courts apply a formalistic interpretation of the business transfer provision. There still exists a 
form-over-substance interpretation of section 197, resulting in unnecessary litigation and 
extensive debate on matters that should be ancillary to the application inquiry. It is submitted that 
the structure built around litigation in labour matters facilitates swift, efficient and inexpensive 
resolution of disputes. However, a significant amount of the cases discussed in this paper have 
been in the SCA and the CC. The dissensus on the meaning of section 197 has resulted in 
litigants taking the matter on appeal; with the appeal courts often yielding different results to the 
courts a quo. It is submitted that courts, particularly the LC, need to apply an objective, fact-
driven approach to section 197, without reliance to the type of transaction being analysed. In 
conclusion, the judgment set by the CC in Aviation Union sets a commendable precedent in how 
to interpret section 197. However, the extent to which the precedent will be followed in 
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